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I. INTRODUCTION
Foreign state immunity' has long been the subject of international debate.
In recent decades Communist governments generally supported an absolute
theory, under which a state enjoys complete immunity from the adjudicatory
jurisdiction of other states, while Western governments promoted a restrictive
theory, under which a state is immune from suit arising from its "sovereign"
or "governmental" acts, but not from its "commercial" or "private" acts. The
difference between the absolute and restrictive theories conformed to the
contrasting relationship between commerce and the state in the two systems.
This East-West debate is now drawing to a close, as the countries of Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union, whose state-trading interests made them
strong supporters of the absolute theory, move steadily toward market econo-
mies. 2
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA or Act), enacted in 1976,1
codifies the U.S. version of the restrictive theory. At the core of the FSIA lies
the commercial activity exception, which requires courts to deny immunity for
the "commercial" activities of a state, while preserving immunity for "sover-
eign" activities.4 The FSIA, however, provides little guidance about how to
1. United States law refers to this doctrine as foreign sovereign immunity, but the doctrine more
commonly is known as foreign state immunity, the phrase this article employs. See Sompong Sucharitkul,
Development and Prospects of the Doctrine of State Immunity: Some Aspects of Codification and Progressive
Development, 29 NETH. INr'L L. REV. 252, 257-58 (1982).
2. The United Nations International Law Commission also has recently rejected the absolute theory
in draft articles on thejurisdictional immunities of states adopted in 1991. SeeDraftArticleson Jurisdiction-
al Immunities of States and Their Property, Report of the International Law Commission to the General
Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doe. A/46/10 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 LL.C.
Report]. The draft articles include exceptions to immunity when the foreign state consents to jurisdiction
(Articles 7-9), and for commercial transactions (Article 10), certain employment contracts (Article 11),
certain torts (Article 12), certain real, intellectual and industrial property (Articles 13-14), membership
in corporations (Article 15), and certain arbitral agreements and awards (Article 17). The Report makes
a slight gesture towards the absolute theory by describing the exceptions to immunity as proceedings in
which "the state cannot invoke immunity," implying that states have relinquished their *right" to invoke
immunity. See, e.g., id. art. 10, at 70 (commentary). The Commission, however, failed to agree upon a
rationale for these exceptions, and instead "decided to operate on a pragmatic basis, taking into account
the situations involved and the practice of States." Id. art. 10, at 68-69 (commentary).
3. United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2892 (1976)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391(b), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1988)).
4. See Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 60 U.S.L.W. 4510, 4511 (U.S. June 12, 1992) (stating
that commercial activity exception is "[tihe most significant of the FSIA's exceptions'). Courts and com-
mentators frequently define the restrictive theory solely in terms of the commercial activity exception. See,
e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983) ('immunity is confined to suits
involving the foreign sovereign's public acts, and does not extend to cases arising out of a foreign state's
strictly commercial acts"). Similarly, Congress explicitly mentioned only the commercial activity exception
in the FSIA's statement of purpose: "Under international law, states are not immune from the jurisdiction
of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1988).
The FSIA contains a second important exception to immunity, the noncommercial tort exception, which
does not depend upon whether the foreign government's activity is "sovereign" or "private." See infra notes
228-236 and accompanying text; see generally JoSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNmENTS
AND TIR CORPORATIONS § 6.20 (1988) (discussing noncommercial tort exception). The Act also retains
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distinguish commercial from sovereign activities. The Act simply defines a
"commercial activity" as "either a regular course of commercial conduct or
a particular commercial transaction or act,"5 directs a court to determine the
"commercial character" of an activity by reference to its "nature" and not its
"purpose,"' and denies immunity in any case involving a commercial activity
with the requisite nexus to the United States. 7
As the absolute theory recedes into history, it will become increasingly
apparent that, simply put, there exists no coherent restrictive theory of foreign
state immunity.8 This incoherence has been the subject of much criticism,9
three exceptions recognized even during the period when the absolute theory dominated: waiver of immuni-
ty, real property, and property acquired by gift or succession. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1988). See HOUSE
JUDICIARY COMM., JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES COURTS IN SUITS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES, H.R.
REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, 20 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6618-19
[hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. Congress added an exception in 1988 for actions to enforce or confirm
arbitral awards. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6) (1988), amended by An Act to Implement the Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Pub. L. 100-669, 102 Stat. 3969, § 2(3) (1988). The
FSIA's expropriation exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3), which governs "rights in property taken in
violation of international law," is a peculiarity of U.S. law and has been the subject of only limited
litigation. See DELLAIENNA, supra, §§ 6.13-6.16. The Act also denies immunity with respect to various
counterclaims. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b)-(d); see supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988).
6. Id. Of the states enacting a foreign state immunity statute since 1976, only Canada has applied a
terse definition of "commercial activity" similar to that found in the FSIA. See infra note 191 and
accompanying text; see generally Peter Trooboff, Foreign State Immunity: Emerging Consensus on
Principles, 1986-V REcurIL DES Couns 235, 308-10 (reviewing different statutory approaches to foreign
state immunity). Courts have condemned extensively the FSIA's commercial activity exception. See infra
note 19. The American Bar Association supported an amendment to the commercial activity exception in
1988, but the Executive Branch opposed the legislation and it was not enacted. See infra note 101.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988); see infra note 55 (quoting provision). The problems created by
the FSIA's nexus requirement generally lie beyond the scope of this article, but certain aspects are ad-
dressed infra notes 55, 182-187 and accompanying text.
8. As Professor James Crawford has noted, "[i]t is confidently asserted what sovereign immunity is
not .... Sovereign immunity is not absolute.... But what is clear is that we lack a rationale ... for
this state of affairs." James Crawford, International Law and Foreign Sovereigns: Distinguishing Immune
Transactions, 1983 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 75, 75. Professor Crawford rejected the "governmental" versus
.commercial" rationale for restrictive immunity, id. at 76-77, 114, and criticized the "nature"/"purpose"
distinction on which the U.S. commercial activity exception depends. Id. at 96. He proposed instead a set
of specific rules for enumerated categories of cases, id. at 114, and the Australian Law Reform Commis-
sion, of which he was Commissioner in Charge, adopted this approach when drafting the Foreign States
Immunities Act, 1985, No. 196 (Austl.), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 715 (1986) [hereinafter Australian Immu-
nity Act]. See infra note 185.
9. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 333 (4th ed. 1990) (noting
conflicting decisions by national courts and arguing that restrictive theory is "substantially flawed," and
concluding that "a satisfactory mode of application of the principle of restrictive immunity has yet to be
developed'); HerschLauterpacht, The Problem ofJurisdictionalImmunitiesofForeign States 28 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 220, 228-32 (1951) (advancing "unorthodox" view that international law dbes not mandate foreign
state immunity, dismissing suggestions that "equality," "independence," or "dignity" of foreign states
requires provision of immunity, and rejecting purported distinction between acts jure gestionis [private acts]
and jure imperil [public acts]); Ian Sinclair, The Law of Sovereign Immunity. RecentDevelopments, 1980-Il
REcUIL DES CouRs 113, 214 (concluding that no asserted rationale for foreign state immunity "affords
a fully satisfactory intellectual justification for the theory'); Michael Singer, Abandoning Restrictive Sover-
eign Immunity:An Analysis in Terms ofJurisdiction to Prescribe, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 2 (1985) (arguing
that existing approaches to foreign state immunity necessarily lead to inconsistent results because a national
court's distinction between private acts and public acts derives from "its particular view as to the ap-
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and several commentators have proposed new approaches to the problem. 10
For example, an assimilationist approach, first advanced by Hersch
Lauterpacht, proposes that foreign states be "assimilated" to the position of
the forum state in its own court, thereby abolishing foreign state immunity
except for some narrow exceptions.11 A second approach suggests reversing
the presumption of immunity underlying existing law and beginning from an
"assumption of non-immunity, qualified by reference to the functional need
... to protect the sovereign rights of foreign States operating or present in
the territory."" A third approach advocates replacing the present law of
foreign state immunity with an analysis of the forum and foreign states'
jurisdiction to prescribe, recommending that where this analysis yields "inde-
terminate" results, courts should resort to the act of state doctrine.13 A fourth
approach, developed by Professor Ian Brownlie and endorsed by the Institute
of International Law, concludes that restrictive immunity is primarily an immu-
nity ratione materiae (by reason of the material), which "affects the essential
competence of the local courts in relation to the particular subject-matter."14
This approach requires courts to balance criteria indicative of forum state
competence against criteria indicative of forum state incompetence. Each of
these proposals departs significantly from the notions of foreign state immunity
contained in existing statutes, conventions, and case law, which accept that
foreign states are immune subject to specified exceptions. 5
These various approaches put the present restrictive theory under a micro-
scope, making its defects painfully clear. Despite the potential benefits of the
radical surgery recommended by some commentators, however, political
realities leave the ultimate adoption of their proposals unlikely. 6 Rather than
embracing any of these sweeping doctrinal shifts, or deferring the search for
propriate economic and political roles of the state"). See generally GAMAL BADR, STATE IMMUNITY (1984);
R. Higgins, Certain Unresolved Aspects of the Law of Sovereign Immunity, 29 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 265
(1982).
10. See generally Ian Brownlie, Contenporary Problems Concerning the Jurisdictional Immunitles
of States, 62-I INST. INT'L L. Y.B. 45, 53-85 (1987) (discussing various approaches).
11. The exceptions include: 1) legislative acts of a foreign state; 2) a foreign state's executive and
administrative acts in its own territory; 3) contracts made by a foreign state that occur outside thejurisdic-
tion of the forum state under rules of private international law; and 4) actions in violation of the interna-
tional law of diplomatic immunity. Lauterpacht, supra note 9, at 226, 236-39; see also BADR, supra note
9, at 90-91 (endorsing Lauterpacht's "assimilative" theory of foreign state immunity, while arguing that
Lauterpacht's four exceptions are not grounded in immunity doctrine, but rather are examples of lack of
forum state jurisdiction).
12. Sinclair, supra note 9, at 215.
13. Singer, supra note 9, at 59; see also infra note 69 (discussing act of state doctrine).
14. BRoWNLIE, supra note 9, at 330-36; see also Institute of International Law, Resolution on Contem-
porary Problems Concerning the Immunity of States in Relation to Questions of Jurisdiction and Enforce-
ment, Sept. 2, 1991 [hereinafter 1991 I.I.L. Resolution] (endorsing Professor Brownlie's approach) (on
file with author).
15. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988); 1991 L. C. Report, supra note 2, art. 5, at 37, 37-39 (com-
mentary).
16. See infra notes 155-157 and accompanying text.
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substantive coherence and consistency (as another commentator has pro-
posed),17 this article advocates a middle course, urging practical, feasible
reforms to the present system within the existing paradigm of immunity quali-
fied by exceptions. Congress should abandon the FSIA's current distinction
between "commercial" and "sovereign" activities, and instead should revise
the commercial activity exception to adopt a functional approach to identifying
commercial activities.
A functional approach finds its roots in the related doctrine of diplomatic
immunity, which developed as a corollary of a monarch's personal prerogatives
but now exists as a functional doctrine that balances the interests of sending
and receiving states and accords immunity to the extent necessary to permit
diplomacy. The rules of diplomatic immunity are almost universally accepted,
stand firmly rooted in reciprocity, and are relatively clear and predictable. This
article argues that the commercial activity exception should be reconceived in
a similar fashion, as a doctrine that prevents undue interference in the functions
of a foreign state. Existing exceptions to foreign state immunity should be
replaced with specific functional rules that give effect to the interests advanced
by U.S. adherence to restrictive immunity: consistency with international law,
fairness to plaintiffs who would have access to U.S. courts in the absence of
immunity, and protection of the interest of the United States as a potential
defendant in a foreign court. For cases that fall outside the proposed rules, a
revised statute should expressly direct courts to base their decisions on a
weighing of these same interests.
Part I of this article reviews the evolution of the doctrine of foreign state
immunity. It concludes that the FSIA's commercial activity exception principal-
ly rests upon outmoded nineteenth century notions of absolute immunity and
sovereignty. Rather than embodying a coherent restrictive theory, the Act
simply restricts application of the absolute theory to "sovereign" activities. Part
I then surveys judicial opinions applying the commercial activity exception,
and concludes that U.S. foreign state immunity law has begun to disintegrate,
as evidenced by several significant decisions that disregard the statute's
inadequate definition of "commercial activity."
Part IV therefore suggests that Congress discard the commercial/sovereign
distinction and revise the commercial activity exception of the FSIA in four
ways. First, the Act should require courts to identify each cause of action with
precision before classifying a challenged act as commercial. Second, the Act
17. After a careful survey of national statutes, national court decisions, and international codification
projects, Professor Trooboff recommends that we avoid these conceptual and political debates with a
convention dealing only with the procedural aspects of foreign state immunity. Trooboff, supra note 6,
at 235, 407-13. A procedural convention might be a useful first step in the international codification of
foreign state immunity, but would not diminish the importance of revising the substance of U.S. foreign
state immunity law.
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should require courts to decide whether they possess personal jurisdiction over
the foreign state defendant before determining whether that state is immune.
Third, Congress should replace the single commercial activity exception with
an enumeration of specific exceptions drawn from other states' restrictive
immunity statutes and current caselaw under the FSIA. Finally, for cases that
fall outside these enumerated criteria, the statute should also deny immunity
if: 1) a U.S. court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant; 2) the exercise
of such jurisdiction is not inconsistent with international law; and 3) adjudica-
tion will not unduly interfere with the functions of the foreign government.
Courts must consider several factors to determine what constitutes undue
interference with foreign government functions. These include the extent and
significance of the U.S. interest in exercising jurisdiction, whether the court
would be required to adjudicate the content, conduct, and precise implementa-
tion of government policies or only the modalities of their implementation, and
the reciprocity implications of the exercise of jurisdiction, taking into account
U.S. assertions of immunity in foreign courts and U.S. law governing the
immunity of the United States in its own courts."8
United States courts have criticized the FSIA repeatedly for failing to
provide them with adequate guidance as to how to determine the immunity of
various transactions.19 A more coherent and detailed FSIA would respond to
18. Some of the specific proposals made here could be accomplished judicially, e.g., the recom-
mendations that courts identify each cause of action precisely before engaging in immunity analysis, and
that courts decide personal jurisdiction before making the immunity determination. Courts could avoid
reciting the sterile distinction between "commercial" and "sovereign" acts and could give greater emphasis
to the functional implications of their decisions, even under the existing commercial activity exception,
by considering whether a particular decision is consistent with international law, promotes fairness to
plaintiffs, and respects potential reciprocity implications. The enumerated exceptions proposed here as a
replacement for the existing commercial activity exception would, however, require legislative enactment.
A Supreme Court case decided as this article was going to press strongly suggests that the courts are
unlikely to correct the deficiencies of the FSIA's commercial activity exception. In Republic of Arg. v.
Weltover, Inc., 60 U.S.L.W. 4510, 4511 (U.S. June 12, 1992), the Supreme Court held that Argentina
and its central bank were not immune from a suit seeking to compel the bank to honor obligations under
bonds that it had unilaterally rescheduled to meet Argentina's foreign debt burden. The Court squarely
embraced the "sovereign"/'commercial" distinction, endorsed the private person test as the means for
divining the "nature" of an activity, and reined in lower court forays into consideration of "purpose." Id.
at 4511-12; see infra notes 102-105, 149-150 and accompanying text (discussing Weltover). The Court's
denial of immunity was correct, but its private person analysis will prove inadequate in more complex
cases. See infra notes 149-152 and accompanying text. The Court has also granted certiorari in a second
case in which it is asked to interpret the commercial activity exception. See Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923
F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3827 (U.S. June 9, 1992) (No. 91-522) (presenting
argument by safety engineer alleging torture and detention by Saudi Arabia for reporting safety violations,
that Saudi government is not immune because alleged acts derived from his recruitment, a commercial
activity, in United States); see infra note 182 (discussing Nelson).
19. The courts have been critical of the FSIA in general. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta,
549 F. Supp. 1094, 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (describingFSIA as "statutory labyrinth" with "bizarre structure
and . . . many deliberately vague provisions"). A number of decisions also specifically criticize the
commercial activity exception. See, e.g., Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Arg., 941 F.2d 145, 149 (2d Cir.
1991) (stating exception contains "amorphous standards" of "Olympian generality"), affid, 60 U.S.L.W.
4510 (U.S. June 12, 1992); Millen Indus., Inc. v. Coordination Council for N. Am. Affairs, 855 F.2d
879, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating exception "does not further distinguish between" nature and purpose);
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these judicial pleas for clarification, and thereby would increase the predictabil-
ity of decisions, allowing private parties and foreign states to take U.S. foreign
state immunity law into account when planning their activities. Greater predict-
ability would also lessen the likelihood that implementation of the FSIA would
give rise to foreign policy problems. Finally, a well-articulated domestic
foreign state immunity law would enhance the credibility of the United States
in the developing North-South debate over foreign state immunity.2"
HI. FROM THE SCHOONER EXCHANGE TO THE FSIA:
NINETEENTH-CENTURY THEORY AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY LAW
Courts traditionally trace the U.S. doctrine of foreign state immunity to
The Schooner Exchange v. M'Fadden,21 in which the Supreme Court held a
French warship immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. Chief Justice
Marshall began the Court's analysis by stating that "the jurisdiction of the
nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is
susceptible of no limitation, not imposed by itself. "I Despite this "perfect
equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, "I he identified three cate-
gories of cases in which the law understood every, sovereign to waive its exclu-
sive territorial jurisdiction in favor of immunity: cases involving foreign
sovereigns traveling abroad, their ambassadors, and their troops.24 Chief
Segni v. Commercial Office of Spain, 835 F.2d 160, 163 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating definition of exception
.not by itself very helpful'); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1108 n.6 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating
that "[t]he FSIA provides little guidance on this issue'); Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Rep.
of Nig., 647 F.2d 300, 308 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating FSIA provides almost 'no guidance at all" in defining
"commercial" activity); Gregorian v. Izvestia, 658 F. Supp. 1224, 1230-31 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (stating
exception contains "convoluted language" and "confusing wording'); Practical Concepts, Inc. v. Republic
of Bol., 613 F. Supp. 863, 868 (D.D.C. 1985) (quoting Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 308); Braka v.
Bancomer, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 1465, 1469 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating that "line between governmental acts
and nongovernmental acts... may be difficult to draw'); In re Matter of Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561,
565 (S.D. Tex. 1982) ('FSIA, unfortunately, provides little guidance" in determining whether or not an
activity is commercial).
20. The 1991 LLC. Report presaged this debate. The draft articles provide that, in determining
whether a transaction is "commercial," a court should refer "primarily to the nature of the contract or
transaction, but its purpose should also be taken into account if, in the practice of the State which is a party
to it, that purpose is relevant to determining the non-commercial character of the contract or transaction.'
1991 LL C. Report, supra note 2, art. 2(2), at 13. The Commission explained that:
This two-pronged approach.., is designed to provide an adequate safeguard and protection for
developing countries, especially in their endeavours to promote national economic development.
Defendant States should be given an opportunity to prove that, in their practice, a given contract
or transaction should be treated as non-commercial because its purpose is clearly public and
supported by raison d'Etat ....
Id. at 30 (commentary). Such a provision would create great uncertainty about whether or not a particular
transaction would be immune, thereby undercutting one of the principal benefits of the international
codification of foreign state immunity law.
21. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
22. Id. at 136.
23. Id at 137.
24. Id. at 137-40.
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Justice Marshall concluded that the implied license underlying these grants of
personal immunity applied equally to a friendly foreign warship in U.S.
waters.25
In the course of the next century British and U.S. courts moved toward an
absolute theory of foreign state immunity.26 This theory evolved at a time
"when most States were ruled by personal sovereigns who, in a very real
sense, personified the State."27 Indeed, the early state immunity cases in
British and U.S. courts involved either individual foreign sovereigns traveling
abroad or foreign public ships.2" The nineteenth-century Anglo-American
notion of foreign state immunity became highly personalized, and courts often
cited the need to preserve the dignity of the foreign sovereign as one reason
to extend immunity. 9 Positivist views also dominated international legal
theory during this period; these perspectives asserted that all limitations on
state power derived from the will of the state, a position permitting no external
limitations upon its sovereignty."
British and U.S. commentators increasingly criticized the absolute theory
throughout the first half of the twentieth century.31 The notion of absolute
25. Id. at 143. Some courts cite The Schooner Exchange as embracing the absolute theory of state
immunity. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 4, at 3 n.12 (citing cases). However, Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion does not support that view: the opinion concludes that "[a] prince, by acquiring private property
in a foreign country, may possibly be considered as subjecting that property to the territorial jurisdiction
[of that state]." 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 145.
26. Nineteenth-century continental Europe, on the other hand, developed the restrictive theory.
Commentators have thoroughly considered both the continental approach and the movement towards the
absolute theory in the United States and England. See, e.g., ELEANOR ALLEN, THE POSmON OF FORBION
STATES BEFORE NATIONAL CouRTs 3-53 (1933); BADR, supra note 9, at 9-62; Sinclair, supra note 9, at
121-96.
27. Harvard Law School, Research in International Law, Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign
States, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 451, 527 (1932) (draft convention with reporter commentary).
28. BADR, supra note 9, at 17.
29. See Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354,
357 (2d Cir. 1964) ('The doctrine originated in an era of personal sovereignty, when kings could theoreti-
cally do no wrong and when the exercise of authority by one sovereign over another indicated hostility
or superiority.'); De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 117 Eng. Rep. 1246, 1259 (Q.B. 1851) ('To cite a
foreign potentate in a municipal court ... is contrary to the law of nations, and an insult which he is enti-
tled to resent."); see also WILLIAM HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 178 (7th ed. 1917)
('When states were identified with their sovereigns, and the relations of states were in great measure
personal relations of individuals, considerations of courtesy were naturally prominent.").
30. See CHARLEs DE VISSCHR, THEoRY ANDREAU=NPtuBLicINTRNATIoNAL LAW20-21 (1960);
John Humphrey, On the Foundations of International Law, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 231, 233 (1945). This
"absolute sovereignty" of states was reconciled with customary international legal norms through the fiction
of implied consent. In The SchoonerExchange, for example, Chief Justice Marshall held that all exemptions
from territorial jurisdiction "must be derived from the consent of the sovereign of the territory .... This
consent may be implied or expressed." 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 143.
31. See, e.g., CHAPLM HYDE, INTERNATONAL LAW 448 (1922); Charles Fairman, Some Disputed
Applications of the Principle ofState Immunity, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 566, 588-89 (1928); Bernard Fenster-
wald, Jr., Sovereign Immunity and Soviet State Trading, 63 HARv. L. REv. 614, 640 (1950); Lauterpacht,
supra note 9, at 220-37. However, commentators also noted the incoherence of restrictive foreign state
immunity, and cited this as one reason to preserve absolute immunity. See, e.g., G. Fitzmaurice; State
Immunity From Proceedings in Foreign Courts, 14 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 101, 123 (1933) (noting extreme
difficulty of drawing any satisfactory theoretical distinction between one class of state acts and another).
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sovereignty also declined in importance,32 and by the end of the Second
World War commentators generally agreed that state sovereignty was a relative
notion limited by the sovereignty of other states.3" This newer concept of
relative sovereignty undermined any force sovereignty may once have pos-
sessed as a rationale for absolute immunity. By the time the U.S. State Depart-
ment adopted the restrictive theory in the 1952 Tate Letter,' the enormous
expansion in international commerce meant that most foreign state immunity
cases concerned trading activities and contractual obligations, not royalty and
their ships,3" diminishing the persuasiveness of "dignity" as a rationale for
foreign state immunity. 6
The State Department, however, did not suggest any objection to the
rationale of absolute immunity, but simply restricted such immunity to "sover-
eign or public acts ... of a state.""7 Congress took the same approach when
enacting the FSIA in 1976:
The bill would codify the so-called "restrictive" principle of sovereign immunity,
as presently recognized in international law. Under this principle, the immunity of
a foreign state is "restricted" to suits involving a foreign state's public acts (jure
imperii) and does not extend to suits based on its commercial or private acts (jure
gestionis) .3
The nineteenth-century absolute theory thus forms the basis of contemporary
U.S. law of foreign state immunity, from which the FSIA carves a number
of exceptions. Discussion of foreign state immunity still sounds much like it
32. See, e.g., El Salvador v. Nicaragua, 11 AM. J. INT'L L. 674, 718 (Cent. Am. Ct. of Just., 1917)
("The function of sovereignty in a state is neither unrestricted or unlimited. It extends as far as the
sovereign rights of other states.').
33. See Luzius Wildhaber, Sovereignty and International Law, in TBE STRucTuRE AND PROCESS OF
INrERNATIONAL LAW 425, 441 (R. MacDonald & Douglas Johnston, eds., 1983). The most important
qualification on sovereignty, and the most significant challenge to the fiction of implied consent upon which
Chief Justice Marshall relied in The Schooner Exchange, may be the emergence ofjus cogens norms from
which states may not derogate, even through an international agreement. See Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 64, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (1969), 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
34. Letter from Jack Tate, Acting Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State, to Acting Attorney General
Philip Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter].
35. The Tate Letter demonstrated that these changes impelled the U.S. move to the restrictive theory:
The reasons which obviously motivate state trading countries in adhering to the [absolute] theory
with perhaps increasing rigidity are most persuasive that the United States should change its
policy .... Mhe Department feels that the widespread and increasing practice on the part of
governments of engaging in commercial activities makes necessary a practice which will enable
persons doing business with them to have their rights determined in the courts.
Id. at 985. The Tate Letter also noted, as reasons for the shift in policy, declining international support
for the absolute theory, the U.S. practice of not claiming immunity overseas for its own merchant ships,
and the fact that the U.S. government subjected itself to suit in U.S. courts. Id.
36. See, e.g., Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 11315
Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Hearings] (stating that "purpose of sovereign immunity
in modem international law is not to protect the sensitivities of 19th-centory monarchs") (testimony of
Monroe Leigh, State Department Legal Adviser).
37. Tate Letter, supra note 34, at 984.
38. HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 6605.
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did in 1812: "The doctrine is 'commonly said to derive from the maxim par
inparem non habet imperium [an equal has no dominion over an equal], which
in turn is grounded in the principles of the independence, the sovereign
equality and the dignity of States.' "" As Professor Brierly cogently stated,
however, "sovereignty is not a metaphysical concept, nor is it a part of the
essence of statehood; it is merely a term which designates an aggregate of
particular and very extensive claims that states habitually make for themselves
in their relations with other states. "4 "Sovereignty," therefore, is at best a
shorthand, and its invocation no longer forms a viable means for a court to
determine whether a foreign state should be immune in a particular case.41
International law currently incorporates a number of other norms that
structure international relations by defining boundaries between national and
international authorities, usually under the rubrics of jurisdiction and compe-
tence.42 Foreign state immunity, for example, may limit a state's potential
responses to the grievances of its nationals against another state. 43 These
structural norms, however, lack well-defined and internationally accepted
content. Without this content, they tell a court that a border exists between the
authority of one state and another, but they do not tell it where the border lies.
This imprecision may be tolerable or even desirable in the realm of state-to-
state political relations. Foreign state immunity, however, sits at the intersec-
tion of public and private international law, is interpreted and applied largely
by national courts, and directly affects both states and private individuals.
Because sovereignty itself represents a concept encompassing a wide variety
of potentially conflicting rights and obligations, judicial consistency and legal
39. Sinclair, supra note 9, at 121.
40. J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 47 (6th ed. 1963).
41. As Professor Higgins has suggested, "[w]ith the emergence of the restrictive doctrine, the concepts
which had previously been used to justify the absolute doctrine, such as the equality and independence of
sovereigns .... their dignity, and the comity of nations, [are] no longer illuminating." Higgins, supra
note 9, at 271.
42. See DAviD KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES 117 (1987) ("Jurisdiction doctrine,
with its discussions of the limits to assertions of national jurisdiction, the authority of the [International
Court of Justice], and of claims to sovereign immunity and extraterritoriality, seems to structure internation-
al life by defining the boundaries of various authorities.').
43. Other norms bear on such a case, including noninterference in the internal affairs of another state,
recognition of a state's prima facie jurisdiction over its territory and population, exhaustion of local
remedies, limitation of jurisdiction of international adjudication to states that consent to such jurisdiction,
and the rules of private international law. See BROWNLE, supra note 9, at 287-88 (identifying these "princi-
pal corollaries" of sovereignty and equality of states); see also Crawford, supra note 8, at 78-85 (arguing
that no clear rule has emerged to allocatejurisdiction between forum state and defendant state). Jurists often
explain these additional concepts in terms of the sovereignty, equality, or independence of states. Professor
Brierly, however, suggests this explanation proceeds in the wrong order, arguing instead that it is the
totality of these concepts that gives content to the notion of sovereignty. BRJERLY, supra note 40, at 47.
Professor Brownlie has noted further that reference to "the principles of immunity, of equality of States,
and of par in parem non habetjurisdictionem [an equal has no jurisdiction over an equal] is completely
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predictability will not result from immunity decisions based upon the maxim
that the sovereignty of one state extends no further than the sovereignty of
another.
III. APPLICATION OF THE FSIA's COMMERCIAL ACTIwITY EXCEPION
Two principal purposes supported Congressional enactment of the FSIA:
to codify the restrictive theory of foreign state immunity and to shift immunity
determinations from the Executive Branch to the courts.' The Act makes
foreign states4' immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts unless one of
eight exceptions applies.'- Section 1605(a) denies immunity to a foreign state
in a case which involves: 1) a state that has waived immunity; 2) an action
based on a "commercial activity" with a specified nexus to the United States;
3) rights in property taken in violation of international law; 4) rights in immov-
able property located in the United States or property located in the United
States acquired by gift or succession; 5) certain "noncommercial torts"; and
(6) enforcement or confirmation of arbitral awards.47 The Act also denies
immunity with respect to various counterclaims" and suits in admiralty.49
Unfortunately, the FSIA supplies a tautological definition of "commercial
activity" as "either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular
commercial transaction or act."50 The admonishment that the "commercial
character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the
course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to
its purpose" forms the only other guidance in the Act on the meaning of
"commercial activity."51 Courts use two approaches when applying the com-
mercial activity exception, occasionally in tandem. First, courts consider
44. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 6605-06. The Act also advanced two other purposes: it provided
a statutory procedure for a court to establish personal jurisdiction over a foreign state, rendering unneces-
sary litigants' pre-FSIA practice of seizing and attaching foreign government property to obtain jurisdiction,
and it permitted execution of judgments under prescribed circumstances. Id. at 6606.
45. The Act defines "foreign state" to include political subdivisions, agencies, and other state instru-
mentalities. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(a)-(b) (1988).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988). Federal district courts possess original jurisdiction over any claim for
relief, provided the foreign state is not immune, § 1330(a), and may exercise jurisdiction over the foreign
state following proper service of process under special rules for foreign states. § 1608. Section 1441(d)
of the Act also permits foreign states to remove cases against them from state to federal courts.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1988).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1607 (1988).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b)-(d) (1988). The Act also provides immunity for the property of foreign states
from attachment or execution unless covered by one of the Act's exceptions (which are more limited than
those applying to immunity from jurisdiction), §§ 1610-1611, and distinguishes between execution against
the property of agencies or instrumentalities and the property of the foreign state itself. § 1610(b).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988).
51. Id. United States courts occasionally determined immunity by referring to an activity's purpose
before the promulgation of the FSIA in 1976. See, e.g., Kingdom of Roumania v. Guaranty Trust Co.,
250 F. 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 663 (1918) (foreign state immune because army boots
purchased for military purposes).
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whether the activity should be considered "commercial" because a private
person can engage in it. Second, courts consider whether the activity should
be considered "sovereign," and therefore cannot be "commercial." A survey
of cases employing these approaches demonstrates that, whether used alone
or together, they fail to provide a sound basis for determining whether a
foreign state should be immune.
A. The Private Person Test
Most courts apply the "private person test," articulated by Judge Kaufman
of the Second Circuit in Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic
of Nigeria, to determine whether the "nature" of an activity is commercial.52
Under this analysis a court first must identify the "relevant" activity in the
case.53 The court then considers whether the activity is commercial by asking
whether it is an activity in which a private person can engage.54 Finally, the
court applies the FSIA's minimum contacts standard.55
52. 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). Judge Kaufman relied on the
House Report, which defined a commercial activity as one "of the same character as... might be made
by a private person." Id. at 309 (citing HousE REPoRT, supra note 4, at 16). Other decisions applying the
private person test include Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, 60 U.S.L.W. 4510, 4512 (U.S. June 12, 1992);
Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Ctr. v. Hellenic Rep., 877 F.2d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 1989), cert
denied, 493 U.S. 937 (1989); Millen Indus., Inc. v. Coordination Council for N. Am. Affairs, 855 F.2d
879, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlman, 853 F.2d 445, 452 (6th Cir. 1988);
Segni v. Commercial Office of Spain, 835 F.2d 160, 164 (7th Cir. 1987); Meadows v. Dominican Rep.,
817 F.2d 517, 523 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976 (1987); West v. Multibanco Comermex,
S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 825 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A.,
764 F.2d 1101, 1108 (5th Cir. 1985); Velidor v. L/PIG Benghazi, 653 F.2d 812, 817 n.7 (3rd Cir. 1981),
cert. dismissed, 455 U.S. 929 (1982); LeDonne v. Gulf Air, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 1400, 1409 (E.D. Va.
1988).
53. Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 308.
54. Id. at 309-10.
55. Id. at 314. Under the Act, a foreign state is not immune in any case
in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988). A district court has statutory subject matter jurisdiction under § 1330(a)
of the Act if a litigant meets one of these standards. Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 308. Judge Kaufman
concluded that a court could exercise personal jurisdiction under the Act only if it possessed subject matter
jurisdiction and there had been proper service of process. Id. Thus, under the current test, both competence
(subject matterjurisdiction) and personal jurisdiction depend on whether the foreign state is immune. This
fusion of normally distinct issues has led to considerable criticism. See id. at 306; DELLAPENNA, supra
note 4, at 9; see generally infra notes 181-183 and accompanying text.
The FSIA's nexus provisions are at issue in Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1991),
cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3827 (U.S. June 9, 1992) (No. 91-522). The plaintiff alleges that he was de-
tained and tortured by Saudi agents while employed in Saudi Arabia as an engineer. The FSIA denies immu-
nity for certain noncommercial torts, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1988), see infra note 228, but only if they
occur in the United States. Argentine Rep. v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989).
The Eleventh Circuit held that Nelson's recruitment and hiring in the United States constituted a "com-
mercial activity," and that causes of action for injuries sustained during his alleged detention and torture
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The complaint in Texas Trading alleged that the Nigerian government
entered into and then breached agreements to purchase cement.-" Judge
Kaufman concluded that the relevant activity could be either the aggregated
cement purchases or each individual contract or letter of credit." He deter-
mined that a private person can engage in either activity, and therefore denied
immunity.58 Unfortunately, both the first and the second steps in this test are
flawed, and cases applying the Texas Trading test reach conflicting and unpre-
dictable results.
1. Identification of the Relevant Activity
The first step in Judge Kaufman's analysis-identification of the relevant
activity-may seem straightforward in a case like Texas Trading. A "contract,"
"contract for the purchase of cement," and "breach of contract for the purchase
of cement" certainly represent activities in which a private person can engage.
In more complex cases, however, the immunity of the foreign state varies
according to the court's identification of the relevant activity. The private
person test becomes particularly problematic when courts infuse their definition
of the relevant activity with the purpose of the activity, with the activities of
other components of the foreign state, or with the overall operations the
foreign state performed.
In MOL, Inc. v. People's Republic of Bangladesh,59 for example, the
Bangladesh Ministry of Agriculture granted MOL a license to capture and
export a specified quantity of rhesus monkeys at designated prices. MOL
undertook to build a breeding farm and agreed that the animals would be used
only "for the general benefit of all peoples of the world."6 After the market
price of monkeys rose, Bangladesh terminated the agreement, claiming that
MOL failed to construct the farm and sold monkeys to the U.S. military in
violation of the agreement. MOL sought arbitration under the agreement, and
Bangladesh refused. MOL then sued Bangladesh in the United States, seeking
damages for Bangladesh's termination of the license agreement.6
were "based on" that commercial activity because they allegedly occurred in retaliation for his reporting
safety violations at the hospital where he was employed.
A separate and final step in Judge Kaufman's approach is consideration of whether the foreign state's
contacts with the United States are sufficient to satisfy the due process standards of the Fifth Amendment.
Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 306; 313 & 313 n.36. As discussed infra note 182, it has been argued that
this due process analysis is in fact part of the statutory personal jurisdiction inquiry and is not a separate
test.
56. 647 F.2d at 306.
57. Id. at 308.
58. Id. at 310.
59. 572 F. Supp. 79 (D. Or. 1983), aft'd, 736 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1984).
60. 572 F. Supp. at 81.
61. Id. at 81-82.
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The district court determined that "the 'nature' of the activity in suit is the
regulation of wildlife," found such regulation to be "a sovereign activity," and
therefore held Bangladesh to be entitled to immunity.62 MOL argued on
appeal that the activity in question concerned not the control of exports nor
the regulation of wildlife, but rather a simple sales contract.63 The Ninth
Circuit disagreed, holding that the case involved more than a "contract for
trade of monkeys. It concerned Bangladesh's right to regulate imports and
exports, a sovereign prerogative. It concerned Bangladesh's right to regulate
its natural resources, also a uniquely sovereign function."" Therefore, the
court held, because a private person could not enter into such an agreement,
Bangladesh must be immune from suit.65 By defining the relevant activity in
these terms, the court of appeals examined the foreign government policy that
the activity advanced, rather than the activity itself.66 As such, the court's
analysis looked at least in part to the purpose of the activity, contrary to the
FSIA's instructions.
Courts have also failed to distinguish the acts of the named defendant from
the acts of other agencies or organs of the foreign state. In Callejo v. Ban-
comer, S.A. ,67 for example, the plaintiffs sued a state-owned Mexican bank
when new currency exchange controls imposed by the Mexican government
significantly reduced the value of dollar-denominated certificates of deposit
they had acquired from the bank. The district court dismissed the case, finding
plaintiffs' claim to be "'based upon' the promulgation by Mexico of exchange
control regulations-a sovereign act."68 The Fifth Circuit reversed, correctly
concluding that the district court's "'analysis must focus on the named defen-
dant's acts which are the basis of the action and not on the separate acts of
other sovereign instrumentalities or agencies."' 69
62. Id. at 84.
63. 736 F.2d at 1328-29.
64. Id. at 1329 (citations omitted).
65. Id.
66. One of the drafters of the FSIA wrote that the MOL "decision sets back the law 30 years.' Mark
B. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in Perspective: A Founder's View,
35 INT'L & COM. L.Q. 302, 309 (1986).
67. 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985).
68. The unreported district court opinion was summarized by the court of appeals. Id. at 1107.
69. Id. at 1108 (quoting Braka v. Bancomer, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 1465, 1469 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(reviewing breach of contractand securities action against Mexican bank)). The Fifth Circuit also criticized
a second unreported district court opinion, Frankel v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, No. 82-6457 (S.D.N.Y.
May 31, 1983), which found a Mexican bank immune because its actions were taken to comply with the
new currency control regulations. Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1108-09. However, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the
complaint in Collejo on the basis of the act of state doctrine, despite its finding that the Mexican defendant
was not immune. The court noted that the act of state doctrine can apply even when the foreign state is
not a party to the suit "and even if the suit is not based specifically on a sovereign act." Id. at 1113. The
court held that "sovereign acts taken by Mexico to preserve its foreign exchange reserves"justified applying
the act of state doctrine to dismiss the case. Id. at 1126.
In its classic formulation, the act of state doctrine provides: "Every sovereign State is bound to respect
the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment
Vol. 17:489, 1992
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Other decisions simply fail to articulate a relevant activity at all, basing
the immunity determination instead on the general characteristics and activities
of a defendant state enterprise. In State Bank of India v. NLRB,' ° for exam-
ple, defendant State Bank, an instrumentality of the Indian government, argued
that the FSIA barred the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) from order-
ing it to bargain with a union. The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument
without defining the relevant activity, because "the commercial operations of
the State Bank bring it outside the scope of the FSIA."71 The district court
in Goethe House, N. Y., German Cultural Center v. NLRB' applied similar
reasoning to hold that the NLRB could not conduct a representation election
for Goethe House's seven non-German employees. The court conferred
immunity upon Goethe House, a government-owned entity that promotes
German culture and German cultural foreign policy, because it constituted a
"conceded arm of a foreign state that is not involved in commercial activi-
on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory." Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S.
250, 252 (1897). The doctrine can be distinguished from foreign state immunity in at least two notable
respects. First, foreign state immunity is, in the first instance, an immunity inpersonam that applies only
when a state or state instrumentality is a defendant; the act of state doctrine is not so limited. Second, courts
apply foreign state immunity to the extraterritorial acts of the foreign state, while the territorial scope of
the act of state doctrine has yet to be definitively established. RESTATEMENT (rHIIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 443 & cmts. a-b (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]
(emphasis added). As the Supreme Court recently noted,
[The] Court's description of the jurisprudential foundation for the act of state doctrine has
undergone some evolution over the years. We once viewed the doctrine as an expression of
international law, resting upon the "highest considerations of international comity and expedi-
ency." Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-304 (1918). We have more recently
described it, however, as a consequence of domestic separation of powers, reflecting "the strong
sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign
acts of state may hinder" the conduct of foreign'affairs. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
Kirkpatrick Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 404 (1990). The Kirkpatrick Court noted
several possible exceptions to the doctrine, including an exception for "commercial transactions, since
neither modern international comity nor the current position of our Executive Branch accorded sovereign
immunity to such acts." Id. at 404-05 (citations omitted). A possible commercial activity exception to the
act of state doctrine further undermines suggestions that the act of state doctrine should supplant immunity
analysis. See RICHARD FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
139-69 (1964). There exists no reason to suppose that any such exception would be more coherent or easy
to apply than restrictive foreign state immunity; indeed, some commentators argue that the act of state
doctrine should be abandoned. See e.g., Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U.
PA. L. REV. 325 (1986); Malvina Halberstam, Sabbatino Resurrected: The Act of State Doctrine in the
Revised Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 68 (1985).
70. 808 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1986).
71. Id. at 535; see also Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Arg., 753 F. Supp. 1201, 1206 n.7 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (denying immunity to Argentine Central Bank on grounds that bank was not responsible for fiscal
policy), aff'd, 941 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1991), aft'd, 60 U.S.L.W. 4510 (U.S. June 12, 1992). The court
distinguished the case before it from De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir.
1985), in which the Fifth Circuit granted immunity to a Nicaraguan bank responsible for the control of
Nicaragua's foreign exchange in a suit alleging that the bank failed to honor a check.
72. 685 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), rev'd, 869 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1989).
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ty. "' The court found that, in contrast, the effort to unionize employees in
State Bank of India arose in a "contextI clearly 'commercial' in totality. " 74
Other courts have rejected this open-ended approach in favor of an analysis
that breaks down complex fact situations into the particular elements of each
cause of action, recognizing that the question whether an activity is commercial
may be answered differently for different causes of action. Arango v. Guzman
Travel Advisors Corporation,75 for example, involved a suit by vacationers
who purchased a travel package from a state-owned airline. Immigration
officials, aided by agents of the airline, denied the vacationers entry into the
country on the grounds that they were undesirable aliens. The Fifth Circuit
found the claim against the airline for non-performance of the vacation package
to be based on commercial activity, but held the airline immune from tort
claims alleging injury from the events at the border.76 Arango demonstrates
that when courts "isolate those specific acts of the named defendant that form
the basis of the plaintiff's suit,"'" they can identify "the particular conduct
giving rise to the claim in question.""
Focus on the precise activity underlying each cause of action could have
led to more sound results in the preceding cases.79 In other situations, howev-
er, such an inquiry would go too far. Thus, in cases involving attempts to
unionize (such as occurred in State Bank of India and Goethe House), the
relevant activity would be the same, regardless of the nationality of the affected
employees or the kinds of functions performed by the employees or the foreign
state entity employer. Similarly, the relevant activity in any case alleging
breach of contract would be a "breach of contract." Since a private person can
breach a contract, this would in effect create a per se rule against immunity
for any alleged breach of contract. Such a per se rule conflicts with the
legislative intent underlying the commercial activity exception and has been
rejected by several courts."0
The drafters of the FSIA must have intended some aspects of a contract
be "relevant" to a court's classification of an activity as commercial. The
question is, which aspects? The policy goals advanced by the contract (e.g.,
the regulation of natural resources)? Whether a specific state undertaking (e.g.,
an export license) can be performed only by a state? The functions performed
73. 685 F. Supp. at 430.
74. Id. at 430 n.4.
75. 621 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1980).
76. Id. at 1378-80.
77. De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1391 (5th Cir. 1985).
78. Arango, 621 F.2d at 1379.
79. In MOL, Inc. v. People's Rep. of Bangl., 572 F. Supp. 79 (D. Or. 1983), afid, 736 F.2d 1326
(9th Cir. 1984), for example, the district court might have identified the relevant activity as the alleged
breach of contract by Bangladesh. The courts in the Mexican bank cases could have identified the relevant
activity as the breach of the terms of the certificates of deposit.
80. See infra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
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by the defendant entity (e.g., diplomatic activities or banking)? Beyond breach
of contract cases a court's task becomes even less clear. How, for example,
should a court define the relevant activity in a libel case against a state-owned
newspaper, or in a case in which a foreign state-owned oil well spills and
causes damage in the United States?
The commercial activity exception, as currently articulated, fails to provide
an answer to these questions because no single rule could apply to all causes
of action. No foreign government entity should be immune from an action
alleging breach of contract to paint its building, for example, regardless of the
functions that entity performs. The different functions performed by a govern-
ment-owned corporation and an embassy, however, may require more differen-
tiated immunity rules for cases based on breach of an employment contract.
The FSIA should require courts to identify precisely the elements of each cause
of action, and should include specific rules enumerating categories of relevant
aspects of transactions, to enable courts to determine immunity quickly and
predictably in the majority of cases. Beyond those specific rules, however, the
statute must expressly refer a court back to the interests underlying the com-
mercial activity exception when assessing aspects of an activity relevant to the
immunity determination, to make decisions on more difficult transactions
consistent and predictable.
2. Can a Private Person Engage in the Activity?
The Texas Trading test also produces confusion in its second step, which
requires a court to determine whether a private person "could" engage in the
activity identified. Does this test focus on juridical modality or form, by asking
whether the legal nature of the activity makes it one in which a private person
can or cannot engage (e.g., a contract versus a unilateral administrative act
by a state)? Or does this test focus on subject matter, by asking whether the-
content of the activity, whatever its form, is such that a private person can
engage in it (e.g., a contract for sale of cement versus a contract in which a
state waives taxation)? The Texas Trading court's private person test fails
clearly to distinguish between modality and content, leading to contradictory
results.
Earlier formulations of the private person test focused on the "juridical
nature" of the foreign state's activity. Under that approach the foreign state
enjoyed no immunity if the activity was one in which a private person had the
legal capacity to engage (e.g., making a contract)."1 This test possessed the
81. See, e.g., Claim Against the Empire of Iran, 16 BVerfGE 27, 62, reprinted in 45 I.L.R. 57, 80
(1963) (F.R.G.), in which the German federal constitutional court stated: "[O]ne should rather refer to the
nature of the State transaction or the resulting legal relationships, and not to the motive or purpose of the
State activity. It thus depends on whether the foreign State has acted in the exercise of its sovereign
505
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not inconsiderable advantage of steering courts away from the ultimate govern-
ment purpose of an activity. Apart from keeping courts from considering an
activity's ultimate purpose, however, the juridical nature variant of the private
person test contained major flaws. Foreign states would never enjoy immunity
in cases alleging breach of contract, for example, thereby creating an over-
broad per se rule. Moreover, a private person's legal capacity to engage in a
particular activity varies among legal systems, and it is unclear whether a court
is to look to the forum legal system or to that of the foreign state defendant
to determine immunity. 2
The recent trend in U.S. courts, on the other hand, has been to focus on
the subject matter of the activity in question. Both the district court and the
court of appeals in Practical Concepts, Inc. (PCI) v. Republic of Bolivia,3
for example, followed this approach, but reached different conclusions on the
question of immunity. PCI alleged that Bolivia breached a technical assistance
contract funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID). The
contract included commitments by Bolivia to exempt PCI and its employees
from income tax and customs duties, to provide visas and travel documents,
to expedite such documents as automobile registration and driver's licenses,
and to permit access to U.S. embassy commissaries. However, Bolivia termi-
nated the agreement when it learned that AID would discontinue its funding
of the project. PCI sued, alleging unlawful breach of contract." PCI had
argued that a contract for the purchase of goods and services is a per se
commercial activity, relying on a suggestion to that effect in Texas Trading.'
The district court rejected such a per se rule, concluding that Congress had
decided that courts "'would have a great deal of latitude in determining what
is a "commercial activity.""' The court found that Bolivia's agreement with
PCI contained "numerous terms which only a sovereign state could perform,
and which no private firm or individual going into the market place [sic] could
ever offer."I The court reasoned that the commercial activity exception holds
authority, that is in public law, or like a private person, that is in private law." See also Charles Andrd
Weiss, Competence ou incompdtence des tribunaur a l'egard des iats 9trangers, 1923-1 RECuEIL DES
CouRs 525, 546.
82. See infra notes 120-121, 142-148 and accompanying text (discussing Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871
F.2d 1515 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891 (1989)).
83. 613 F. Supp. 863 (D.D.C.), aft'don reh'g, 615 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C. 1985), aft'd, 811 F.2d 1543
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
84. Bolivia failed to respond to the suit, and the district court entered a default judgment that PCI
sought to execute. Bolivia then moved to set aside the default judgment, asserting, inter alia, that it was
immune from suit. 613 F. Supp. at 865.
85. Id. at 869. The Second Circuit's decision in Texas Trading noted that the legislative history of
the FSIA "seems to conclude that a contract or series of contracts for the purchase of goods would be per
se a 'commercial activity.'" Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Rep. of Nig., 647 F.2d 300, 309
(2d Cir. 1981) (citing HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 6615), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
86. 613 F. Supp. at 869 (quoting HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 6615).
87. 613 F. Supp. at 869.
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"states who do business in the manner of private parties... to the same legal
rules as private parties," but noted that "[b]y granting special legal advantages
to PCI Bolivia was acting in a manner very much unlike a private business
participant."88 The court held that Bolivia was therefore immune, and dis-
missed the suit. 9
The D.C. Circuit reversed, concluding that the activity at issue in the suit
was commercial.9" The court of appeals agreed with the district court's rejec-
tion of a per se rule for contracts and echoed approval of the private person
test. The court held that Congress concluded that foreign states could be
subject to suits on contracts "'of the same character as a contract which might
be made by a private person' . .. . [However,] Congress did not intend that
the 'character' of a contract would turn on its subsidiary rather than its central
prescriptions."91 The tax exemptions and documents to facilitate entry granted
by Bolivia were "auxiliary to the basic exchange:"" since the "essence" of
the Bolivia-PCI contract was the exchange of money for advice, the court
found the contract to be "commercial."" The two opinions in Practical Con-
cepts thus agreed that the subject matter of a contract is dispositive under the
private person test, but they differed in their assessment of the quantum of
"sovereign" subject matter necessary to transform an otherwise commercial
activity into one for which the foreign state is immune.
The D.C. Circuit gave subject matter even greater primacy in Millen
Industries, Inc. v. Coordination Council for North American Affairs
(CCNAA). 94 Millen, a U.S. shoe box manufacturer, alleged that CCNAA
agreed to allow it to locate a manufacturing plant in Taiwan under the favor-
able conditions provided to qualified investors by Taiwanese law, including
duty-free import of raw materials and "easy access" through Taiwanese
customs. MUllen further alleged that it began operations in Taiwan in reliance
on these promises, but that Taiwan subsequently obstructed its importation of
machinery and canceled all duty-free importation of raw materials. Millen
brought an action based on claims of breach of contract, detrimental reliance,
misrepresentation, and conversion. The district court dismissed Millen's
88. Id. at 870.
89. Id. at 872.
90. 811 F.2d at 1545.
91. Id. at 1550.
92. Id.
93. Id. The district court in Tifa, Ltd. v. Republic of Ghana, 692 F. Supp. 393 (D.N.J. 1988), took
a similar approach. The court held that Ghana was not immune from allegations based on its express and
implied promises to pay for equipment and goods to be used in a pesticide project, even though the parties
conditioned the contract upon government waiver of import duties and the cash margin generally required
by the Bank of Ghana. The court concluded that "[a]lthough standing alone the exemption from import
duties and waiver of the mandatory cash margin appear to be governmental activities, these acts were
ancillary to the alleged promise." Id. at 401.
94. 855 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The Taiwan Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 3301, 3303 (1988),
grants both CCNAA and Taiwan the same immunities as those generally accorded foreign states.
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complaint, holding that the act of state doctrine barred consideration of the
case.95 The court of appeals reversed and remanded for consideration of
whether the district court had jurisdiction. In so doing, it resolved the question
the Practical Concepts decision left open: "whether a foreign state would be
entitled to sovereign immunity in an action based on an incidental (perfor-
mance-facilitating) contract term that only a government could offer and
perform."96 The court held that "when a transaction partakes of both com-
mercial and sovereign elements, jurisdiction under the FSIA will turn on which
element the cause of action is based on. Even if a transaction is partly commer-
cial, jurisdiction will not obtain if the cause of action is based on a sovereign
activity."97 The court found that the transaction between Millen and CCNAA
involved both sovereign and commercial elements.98 In such a situation, "to
the extent that the causes of action are based on promises, breaches of promis-
es, and other allegedly actionable conduct involving extending duty-free status
and/or the benefits of Taiwanese law, these would plainly be sovereign aspects
of the transaction over which we lack jurisdiction. "99
The Millen court's exclusive focus on the subject matter of the activity in
question gives no weight to the legal form of a foreign state's under-
taking-i.e., whether it was contained in a contract (as in Practical Concepts)
or was expressed as a unilateral statement by the foreign state of the benefits
that its law extends to investors."° Taken alone, the simple failure of one
state to waive a provision of its law for the benefit of an investor would not
be legally actionable. On the other hand, a plaintiff's allegation that a foreign
state failed to honor a contractual undertaking to provide a tax or customs
duties exemption is legally cognizable precisely because it is included in a
contract. Taken to its extreme, as occurred in Millen, the subject matter
yersion of the private person test tends to result in a per se rule granting
immunity any time the activity giving rise to a cause of action is one normally
95. Millen, 855 F.2d at 881 (noting district court dismissed contract claim "because it alleged promises
relating directly to 'uniquely sovereign' import-export activity and, therefore, was barred by the act of state
doctrine"); see supra note 69 (discussing act of state doctrine).
96. Practical Concepts, 811 F.2d at 1548 n.9 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 1550 n.15.
97. Millen, 855 F.2d at 885.
98. "Promotion of investment is ordinarily a commercial activity; private parties commonly act as
public relations agents. On the other hand, the 'right to regulate imports and exports [is] a sovereign
prerogative.'" Id. (citations omitted) (quoting MOL, Inc. v. People's Rep. of Bangl., 736 F.2d 1326, 1329
(9th Cir. 1984)).
99. Millen, 855 F.2d at 885.
100. In Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), for example, the
district court concluded that an entity owned by the Irish government did not engage in commercial activity
when it "merely apprised" the plaintiffs of special tax incentives available under Irish law. The court
declined to consider the "difficult question," not presented by the case, of the result that would follow if
the defendant instrumentality "had been given its own defacto law-making power in order to offer pro-
spective investors special tax incentives." Id. at 1110 n.6.
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engaged in only by states, regardless of whether it is contained in a con-
tract. 101
In contrast to recent lower court decisions such as Practical Concepts and
Millen, the Supreme Court's decision in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover,
Inc. emphasized the form of the transaction in question, and not its subject
matter. 1° The Court held that Argentina and its central bank were not im-
mune from a suit seeking to compel the bank to honor obligations under bonds
that it had unilaterally rescheduled to meet Argentina's foreign debt burden.
It defined the "nature" of an activity as "the outward form of the conduct that
the foreign state performs or agrees to perform.""1 3 According to the Court,
the issue is whether the particular actions that the foreign state performs (whatever
the motive behind them) are the -ype of actions by which a private party engages
in "trade and traffic or commerce" .... Thus, a foreign government's issuance
of regulations limiting foreign currency exchange is a sovereign activity, because
such authoritative control of commerce cannot be exercised by a private party;
whereas a contract to buy army boots or even bullets is a "commercial" activity,
because private companies can similarly use sales contracts to acquire goods
104
The Court denied immunity because "there [was] nothing about the issuance
of these [instruments] (except perhaps its purpose) that is not analogous to a
private commercial transaction."'' 5 This conclusion is unexceptional with
101. The American Bar Association (ABA) developed a proposed amendment to the FSIA in 1988
that also disregarded the legal form of a forum state's undertaking, but to the opposite effect of the ap-
proach in Millen. The ABA sought to persuade Congress to amend the definition of commercial activity
set forth in § 1603(d) of the Act by appending the statement: "A determination of whether an activity is
commercial in character shall not be affected by the fact that the activity involves acts or undertakings
requiring the exercise of governmental authority. Any such undertakings included in a commercial activity
shall be considered to be commercial in character." H.R. 3763, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). A
spokesperson for the ABA explained that the amendment was intended to correct the results in MOL and
Millen and to "ensurel] that the same rule of non-immunity applies to all undertakings made in a commercial
agreement." Foreign Sovereign ImmunityActArmendments: Hearing on H.R. 3763 Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 81-82, 86-90 (1988) (testimony and statementof MarkFeldman).
The Executive Branch opposed the amendment because it would withdraw immunity from all governmental
acts associated with a commercial activity, without regard to the legal form of the act or its relationship
to the particular cause of action:
[1]f a foreign state undertakes in a commercial contract to perform certain acts requiring the exer-
cise of sovereign authority, the plaintiff should be able to enforce those provisions of the contract.
The term 'included in a commercial activity,' however, is extremely broad and would appear
to include governmental undertakings not given for consideration or not intended by the parties
to be binding, but somehow associated with a commercial activity.
Id. at 35-36 (testimony of Elizabeth G. Verville, Deputy Legal Advisor, State Department) (emphasis in
original).
102. 60 U.S.L.W. 4510, 4511 (U.S. June 12, 1992).
103. Id. at 4512. The Court defined the purpose of an activity as "the reason why the foreign state
engages in the activity," and specifically rejected Argentina's argument that immunity should turn on
whether the foreign government is acting with a profit motive or "with the aim of fulfilling uniquely
sovereign objectives." Id. (emphasis in original).
104. Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
105. Id. The Court left open the possibility that, even for other cases arising out of the issuance of
bonds, the form of the instrument might not be dispositive. Argentina had argued that the Second Circuit
opinion created a per se rule denying immunity for actions based on debt instruments. The Court concluded,
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respect to the issuance of bonds in Weltover. Unfortunately, however, the
Court's private person test does not suggest what features might transform a
transaction that is otherwise "commercial" in form into a "sovereign" activity.
As noted earlier, whether or not a foreign government's activity is "analogous
to a private commercial transaction" often depends entirely on how a court
defines the relevant activity. In cases more complicated than Weltover, there-
fore, courts are still left with a private person test that is unduly formalistic
and easily manipulated.
Cases based on the alleged breach of employment contracts illustrate the
shortcomings of the private person test. In Segni v. Commercial Office of
Spain,1°6 for example, the Commercial Office hired Segni, an Argentine
national, to market Spanish wines in the midwestern United States. Segni sued
the Commercial Office for breach of contract following his termination, and
the Commercial Office asserted immunity. 7 The district court denied the
claim of immunity" 8 and the Seventh Circuit affirmed." ° The court of ap-
peals defined the relevant activity as a contract to provide product marketing
services, and held that immunity should be denied because a private person
can engage in such an activity.' The court principally relied on the Act's
legislative history to support this holding."' It cited the House Report, which
stated that "employment of diplomatic, civil service, or military personnel, but
not the employment of American citizens or third country nationals by the
foreign state in the United States, . . . [is] public or governmental . . . in
nature," and which also provided that employment of "laborers, clerical staff
or public relations or marketing agents" is a "commercial activity.""I
These examples in the House Report helped the Seventh Circuit reach its
decision in Segni, despite the FSIA's vague definition of "commercial activity."
If one hypothesizes slightly different facts, however, the private person test
could lead to a result inconsistent with the House Report. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that a secretary employed in the United States by a foreign government
sues for breach of an employment contract. Under Segni, a court would define
however, that there was "no occasion to consider such aperse rule" in the case as there was nothing about
the instruments that was not analogous to a private commercial transaction. Id.
106. 650 F. Supp. 1042 (N.D. I11. 1986), aff'd, 835 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1987).
107. 650 F. Supp. at 1043.
108. Id. at 1045.
109. 835 F.2d at 166.
110. Id. at 165; cf. Heaney v. Government of Spain, 445 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding Spanish
government immune from breach of contract action brought by U.S. attorney allegedly retained to publicize
British suppression of human rights in Northern Ireland, on grounds that no commercial acts involved);
Friedar v. Government of Isr., 614 F. Supp. 395, 398-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding alleged promise by
Israeli government to compensate plaintiff for injuries suffered while in Israeli army did not constitute
commercial act, because relevant activities, i.e., recruiting soldiers and determining veterans benefits, were
'purely governmental").
111. Segni, 835 F.2d at 165-66.
112. HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 6615.
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the relevant activity as a contract for the purchase of secretarial services. The
foreign state would enjoy no immunity, because the juridical form at issue
would still be a contract, and the subject matter-the purchase of secretarial
services-may be performed by a private person, a result consistent with the
House Report. But what if the foreign state fires the ambassador's personal
secretary for espionage? To avoid forum state interference in the diplomatic
functions of the foreign state, immunity would appear warranted. Under the
private person test, however, neither the juridical form nor the subject matter
of the contract would change and a court could deny immunity.' 13 The differ-
ence between immunity from a suit brought by a member of a nation's diplo-
matic corps terminated because of suspected espionage and immunity from a
similar suit brought by a third country national employed in a commercial
office stems from the functions performed by these employees and the entities
where they work. For a court to consider these factors, however, it must skate
dangerously close to considering purpose.
The simple private person test embraced by the Supreme Court in Weltover
is therefore inadequate to address all breach of contract cases. The inadequacy
of the private person test becomes even clearer when we move beyond contrac-
tual relationships. For example, the definition of the relevant activity seems
entirely arbitrary in cases involving allegations of "trade libel" against a
foreign state." 4 One could fairly describe the activity supporting the cause
of action either as "making libelous statements in connection with a commer-
cial activity" or as "stating a foreign government's official position." Since the
result of the private person test flows automatically from the definition select-
ed, this range of plausible definitions effectively means that the current FSIA
provides courts no guidance.
This criticism also applies to cases considering whether a foreign state can
claim immunity from an action to compel it to bargain with a union. For
example, Canada's Federal Court of Appeals in 1989 applied a definition of
commercial activity borrowed from the FSIA (and also relied heavily on the
Act's legislative history) to hold that the U.S. Navy was not immune from the
jurisdiction of the Canadian Labour Relations Board; the Board sought to hold
union certification proceedings regarding Canadian maintenance workers
employed at a U.S. Navy base in Newfoundland. "' The court stated that it
113. Moreover, the legislative history of the FSIA points in two contrary directions, indicating that
a foreign state would be immune from suit on employment contracts with civil servants, but not immune
on contracts with clerical staff. See id.
114. See, e.g., Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891 (1989);
see also infra notes 142-148 and accompanying text (discussing Gregorian).
115. In re Canada Labour Code, No. A-869-88 (Fed. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 1989), rev'd sub nor. United
States v. Public Serv. Alliance of Can., No. 21,641 (Can.) (May 21, 1992) (on file with author). Canada's
Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the Federal Court of Appeals, declined to apply the private person
test, instead dismissing the case because it involved "sovereign" activities. See infra notes 124-129 and
accompanying text.
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found
no rational basis for distinguishing between contracts for the purchase of goods or
service and contracts of employment .... If, as in my view he is, a supplier of
electricity or groceries ... is entitled to sue the U.S. for breach of contract in a
Canadian court, there seems no reason why a Canadian civilian employee there
should not have a like entitlement. 1
16
In the court's view, the Labour Board's exercise of jurisdiction related to
commercial activity, and consequently the United States could not claim
immunity. Although the court noted it was "disturbed by this result," it found
it could not distinguish employment on the military base from any other
employment relationship without looking beyond the "nature" of the employ-
ment to its broad purpose-to serve U.S. defense requirements. 117
B. The Sovereignty Approach
When courts applying the private person test conclude that immunity may
be warranted, they frequently bolster this conclusion by stating that the immune
activity is "sovereign" or "governmental." This approach does not overcome
the inadequacies of the private person test, as it leads to a confusion of legal
form with content and to an inevitable consideration of the purpose of the
activity. The Ninth Circuit in MOL Inc. v. People's Republic of Bangladesh,
for example, dismissed the case because it found that Bangladesh's right to
regulate exports was a sovereign prerogative.' Likewise the D.C. Circuit
in Millen Industries, Inc. v. Coordination Council for North American Affairs
held in part that, despite the presence of commercial elements in the transac-
tion under consideration, it lacked jurisdiction over causes of action based on
breaches of promises to extend duty-free status or other benefits of Taiwanese
law, because "these would plainly be sovereign aspects of the transaction. "119
Other courts have resorted to a stark evocation of "sovereignty" to justify
a finding of immunity. The Ninth Circuit took this approach in Gregorian v.
Izvestia, in which a U.S. citizen sued Izvestia, then the official newspaper of
the Soviet government, claiming, inter alia, that an article in the paper had
harmed plaintiffs business and therefore constituted trade libel. 12 0 The Ninth
Circuit held that the Soviet defendants were immune because "Izvestia's
writing and publishing of articles reporting or commenting on events constitute
'sovereign or governmental' activities."12 A similar approach supported the
116. Canada Labour Code, slip op. at 8.
117. Id. at 10.
118. 736 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir. 1984).
119. 855 F.2d 879, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
120. 871 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891 (1989).
121. 871 F.2d at 1522 (quoting Statement of Interest of United States); see infra notes 142-148 and
accompanying text.
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holding of the district court in In re Sedco, Inc., which involved a claim of
immunity by Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), an agency of the Mexican
government, from actions brought against it after one of its exploratory wells
in the Gulf of Mexico blew, causing substantial damage in the United
States." The court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the commercial activity
exception gave it jurisdiction after finding that the well was exploratory, was
located in Mexican territorial waters, and was drilled pursuant to the Mexican
government's long-range planning and policymaking process. The court held
that the commercial activity exception was not applicable "[b]ecause the nature
of Pemex' act in determining the extent of Mexico's natural resources was
uniquely sovereign.""
"Sovereignty," not the private person test, also formed the basis of the
Canadian Supreme Court's recent opinion reversing the decision of the Canadi-
an Federal Court of Appeals in United States v. Public Service Alliance of
Canada.24 Three of five justices of the Court concluded that some aspects
of employment at the base were "sovereign," while others were "com-
mercial."'" A "bare employment contract," the Court found, was "for the
most part commercial," but it held that the case before it involved "the struc-
turing of work of the base" which was "sovereign in nature. "26 The Court
was unwilling to apply the private person test outside "the trading context in
which it was developed."' 27 By contrast, the two dissenting justices held that
immunity depended on.whether a private person could hire workers for the
tasks these workers performed.22 Because a private person can hire mainte-
nance workers, the case was "in the nature of a commercial activity." '129
The two approaches taken to the issue in Public Service Alliance underscore
the inadequacy of the U.S. and Canadian definitions of commercial activity.
Both the majority's "sovereignty" approach and the dissent's (and the lower
court's) private person test found ample support in caselaw. Both approaches,
however, divert courts from what would appear to be a more salient question
than either the "sovereignty" or the private person analogy: to what extent
122. 543 F. Supp. 561,566 (S.D. Tex. 1982), vacated, 610 F. Supp. 306 (S.D. Tex. 1984), remanded
on other grounds sub nom Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat'l Oil Co., 767 F.2d 1140
(5th Cir. 1985).
123. 543 F. Supp. at 566. Two years later, the district court vacated its earlier opinion, reasoning
that a trial was needed to determine whether the well was exploratory or for production. 610 F. Supp. at
306.
124. No. 21,641 (Can.) (May 21, 1992) (on file with author), rev'g In Re Canada Labor Code, No.
A-869-88 (Fed. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 1989).
125. No. 21,641 at 3-4.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 5.
128. Id. at 6 (Sopinka and Cory, JJ., dissenting).
129. Id. at 7 (Sopinka and Cory, JJ., dissenting). The dissent thus followed the private person test
applied by the lower court. See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text (discussing Canada Labour
Code)
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would the denial of immunity interfere with the foreign state's functions? The
answer to this question may depend on a number of factors, including the
functions performed by the particular foreign state entity, the functions per-
formed by the particular employees, and the ways that the particular proposed
actions of forum state authorities would (or would not) interfere with the
foreign state's functions. The revisions to the FSIA proposed in Part III below
would enumerate exceptions that would adopt this functional approach and
specifically consider these factors.13
C. Consideration of Purpose
The ban on consideration of purpose contained in section 1603(d) of the
FSIA represents the only guidance contained in the Act on classifying activities
as commercial, and courts generally recite this statutory standard. 131 Recent-
ly, however, several decisions have strayed from the Act and have considered
purpose when classifying an activity. Purpose often enters immunity analysis
when a court identifies the relevant activity so broadly as to embrace the
purpose of the activity. This occurred in MOL, for example, where both the
district court and the Ninth Circuit defined the relevant activity not as breach
of an agreement but rather as regulation of a natural resource. 132
Other courts have simply rejected the express requirement contained in
section 1603(d) that they look to the nature of an activity and not to its pur-
pose. The first court to do so was the Fifth Circuit in De Sanchez v. Banco
Central de Nicaragua."' The plaintiff in De Sanchez purchased a certificate
of deposit in 1978 from Banco Nacional de Nicaragua, dated to mature in
1982. She sought early redemption of her certificate when the Somoza regime
approached collapse in 1979. However, Nicaragua suffered from an acute
shortage of foreign exchange, and even a letter from President Somoza to
Banco Nacional (written two weeks before he fled the country) failed to
produce the redemption. Banco Central ultimately issued a check, but by the
time the plaintiff attempted to cash it in the United States the Sandinista
government was in control and Banco Central had issued stop-payment orders
on all its checks. 3
On review, the Fifth Circuit initially considered whether the commercial
activity exception applied.135 The court identified the relevant activity as
130. See infra notes 204-208 and accompanying text.
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988); see supra text accompanying note 50-51 (quoting provision).
132. MOL, Inc. v. People's Rep. of Bangi., 572 F. Supp. 79, 84 (D. Or. 1983), aff'd, 736 F.2d 1326,
1329 (9th Cir. 1984); see supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text (discussing MOL).
133. 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985).
134. Id. at 1388.
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Banco Central's failure to honor the check issued to Mrs. de Sanchez, and
considered whether that activity was commercial. Noting that "the same
activity can often be characterized in a number of ways,"136 the court charac-
terized Banco Central's failure to honor the check as a "sovereign" activity:
the court concluded that the bank did not enter the marketplace as a commer-
cial actor selling dollars, but rather acted pursuant to its official government
role as regulator of foreign currency reserves and the sale of foreign ex-
change.137 While it recognized that this conclusion was based in part on
consideration of the "purpose" of the bank's activity, the court concluded that
it could not properly analyze the activity any other way. 3 ' If it looked only
to the transaction's nature, the court stated, it would have reached a conclusion
contrary to policies it considered to underlie the FSIA, thereby touching
sharply on "national nerves."139 To avoid this result the court read the na-
ture/purpose distinction out of the FSIA under the guise of statutory interpreta-
tion: "we do not interpret [section 1603(d)]... to bar us totally from consid-
ering the purposes of different types of activities."" The court pointed out
that Congress itself employed a "purpose" test in the examples contained in
the House Report, which included as "commercial" any activity normally
engaged in for profit. 141
Following De Sanchez, the district court in Gregorian v. Izvestia explicitly
rejected the nature/purpose distinction. 142 The plaintiff in Gregorian exported
medical and laboratory equipment to the Soviet Union for approximately ten
years. After a series of contract disputes, the Soviet government revoked the
accreditation certificate that permitted the company to operate in Moscow.
Several days later Izvestia, then the newspaper of the Presidium of the Su-
preme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., published an article about Gregorian entitled
136. Id. The court stated: "Banco Central's issuance of the check could be characterized either as a
sale of foreign currency or as the regulation and supervision of Nicaragua's foreign exchange reserves.
The former is a commercial activity: Private banks often sell foreign currency to one another .... The
regulation and supervision of a nation's foreign exchange reserves, however, is a sovereign activity." Id.
(citations omitted).
137. Id. at 1393-94.
138. The court noted:
[We do not believe that an absolute separation is always possible between the ontology and the
teleology of an act. Often, the essence of an act is defined by its purpose-gift-giving, for
example. Unless we can inquire into the purposes of such acts, we cannot determine their nature.
Indeed, commercial acts themselves are defined largely by reference to their purpose. What
makes these acts commercial is not some ethereal essence inhering in the conduct itself; instead
• acts are commercial because they are generally engaged in for profit.
Id. at 1393.
139. Id. at 1394.
140. Id. at 1393.
141. Id.; see also Segni v. Commercial Office of Spain, 835 F.2d 160, 164 (7th Cir. 1987) (relying
on De Sanchez to conclude that nature and purpose are not totally discrete, and determining that FSIA
permitted courts to look to purpose if they did so "only so far as necessary to define nature").
142. 658 F. Supp. 1224 (C.D. Cal. 1987), af'd, 871 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
891 (1989).
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"Duplicitous Negotiator: A Story about a U.S. Firm and an Abuse of Trust."
Gregorian sued Izvestia and several other Soviet government entities alleging
breach of contract and libel.143
When the Soviet defendants failed to respond, the district court entered a
default judgment, finding jurisdiction pursuant to the commercial activity
exception, and two Soviet defendants then moved to set aside the default judg-
ment. 1' Gregorian claimed that the defendants placed the statements about
him in Izvestia to avoid their contractual obligations, and that therefore the
statements constituted commercial activity, leading the court to conclude that
it was "impossible" to apply the nature/purpose distinction to the case before
it. 4 The court also rejected the private person test because it was "perplexed
as to what political and economic system's criteria to apply."'" Having
thrown up its hands at the nature/purpose distinction and the private person
test, the court based its conclusion that libel did not fall within the commercial
activity exception on the fact that the "noncommercial tort exception" of the
FSIA requires a court to confer immunity upon foreign states from libel
claims. 47 Noting that the U.S. government itself is immune from libel
claims, and criticizing the "jumbled draftsmanship" of the commercial activity
exception, the court concluded that Congress could not have intended the
commercial activity exception to create a loophole in the noncommercial tort
exception by permitting libel claims that were related to commercial activi-
ty. 1
48
As De Sanchez and Gregorian demonstrate, frustration with the
nature/purpose test has prompted courts to disregard the FSIA's express
injunction against consideration of purpose. In Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, Inc., 4 the Supreme Court closed the door on these efforts to
circumvent the statute by rejecting Argentina's argument (based on De San-
chez) that the Court needed to inquire into the purpose of Argentina's activities
in order to determine their nature: "However difficult it may be in some cases
143. Id. at 1226.
144. Id. at 1232-34.
145. Id. at 1232.
146. Id. The court noted that the media in the West were typically privately owned, while the Soviet
Constitution provided that the means of communication were the property of the state. Since the two
systems permitted private parties to pursue different activities, the court declined to apply the private person
test.
147. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1988) provides that foreign states are not immune in any case
not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, in which money damages are sought against
a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the
United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official
or employee of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or employment;
except this paragraph shall not apply to ... any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse
of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.
148. Gregorian, 658 F. Supp. at 1233-34.
149. 60 U.S.L.W. 4510 (U.S. June 12, 1992).
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to separate 'purpose' . . . from 'nature'... , the statute unmistakably com-
mands that to be done."150
The courts' tendency to skirt the FSIA's "purpose" limit is symptomatic
of the inadequacies of existing law. As this survey of decisions demonstrates,
the FSIA's commercial activity exception is insufficiently specific and its
application is confusing and difficult to predict. The only legislative guidance
given to U.S. courts-that they look at the nature and not the purpose of an
activity-defies logical application."' The surrogate for the nature/purpose
distinction, the private person test, depends almost entirely on the way a court
defines the "relevant activity" it is asked to classify. Because there exist no
clear standards for determining the relevant aspects of a transaction, the private
person test can be easily manipulated. The nature/purpose distinction leaves
the courts with the choice of either adhering to the statute and reaching results
that they find "disturbing," '52 or disregarding specific statutory language.
Neither option presents a satisfactory method of developing sound U.S. foreign
state immunity law. Weltover makes clear that the courts will not untangle the
commercial activity exception. We must look instead to Congress.
IV. RETHMNG THE COM mRCIAL ACTIVITY EXCEPTION:
A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
If the nineteenth-century doctrinal premises of foreign state immunity exist
only as anachronisms, and if the statutory nature/purpose test remains a mean-
ingless mantra, one might ask whether the doctrine of foreign state immunity
should be jettisoned entirely. Some commentators have suggested this ap-
proach.' Even these critics, however, recognize the need to protect certain
activities of one state from interference by the courts of another state, and
150. Id. at 4512 (citations omitted).
151. As Sir Hersch Lauterpacht noted over 40 years ago, "the distinction between acts jure gestionis
and acts jure imperii cannot be placed on a sound logical basis. In a real sense all acts jure gestionis are
acts jure imperil, for the state always acts as a public person. It cannot act otherwise."
Lauterpacht, supra note 9, at 224.
152. In re Canada Labour Code, No. A-869-88, slip op. at 10 (Fed. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 1989), rev'd
sub nor. United States v. Public Serv. Alliance of Can., No. 21,641 (Can.) (May 21, 1992) (on file with
author).
153. See, e.g., BADR, supra note 9, at 135 (arguing that "public acts of foreign states, objectively
defined, lie ab initio beyond the jurisdiction of local courts and do not, therefore, raise a proper issue of
immunity"); FALK, supra note 69, at 139-69 (urging that doctrine of foreign state immunity be discarded,
as interests it serves better addressed by act of state doctrine); see also Singer, supra note 9, at 59. For
further discussion of the act of state doctrine, see supra note 69.
Badr and Falk here confront what Sir Ian Sinclair has called "the borderland between sovereign
immunity and the act of State doctrine." SINcLAIR, supra note 9, at 213. When foreign state immunity was
absolute and was invoked by a personal sovereign, it made sense to conceive of the doctrine as an immunity
ratione personae. But now that the doctrine is restricted, it necessarily has a component that is ratione
materiae. Sinclair explains, "[i]mmunity applies ratione personae to identify the category of persons...
by whom it may prima facie be claimable; and ratione materiae to identify whether substantively it may
properly be claimed." Id. at 199.
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simply argue that other doctrines could provide such protection. 154 Moreover,
the fact that all states apparently embrace the doctrine of foreign state immuni-
ty counsels against abolition. 'I States disagree about the scope of the doc-
trine, but agree that international law limits the freedom of one state to exer-
cise adjudicatory jurisdiction over another. 6 Foreign state immunity there-
fore should not be eliminated; rather, the restrictive theory of foreign state
immunity must be revised. A reformed approach to restrictive foreign state
immunity would remove the contradictions in the FSIA and would meet greater
acceptance among governments than a new doctrine, however conceptually
sound. 157
The universal acceptance of foreign state immunity demonstrates wide-
spread recognition of the need to restrain the authority of domestic courts.
Such acceptance appears to result not from shared conceptions of "sovereign-
ty," but rather from a common-and more pragmatic-conviction that a court
of one state should not be permitted to exercise jurisdiction over another state
if this would unduly interfere with the functions of that state. Foreign state
immunity doctrine has contained such a functional dimension since the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Fadden, 8 but
154. Badr accepts this point, but believes that "any true actjure imperii of a foreign state would not
meet the requirement of minimum jurisdictional contacts with the country of the forum and would therefore
lie squarely outside the jurisdiction of the local courts." BADR, supra note 9, at 97. However, a number
of the difficult cases discussed above in which immunity appears to be warranted, e.g., the libel claim in
Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891 (1989), and cases that could
arise out of employment of foreign diplomats in the United States, would encounter no jurisdictional
obstacle under private international law.
155. See, e.g., Responses to I.L.C. Questionnaire, in UNITED NATIONS LEGIsLATIVE SnRiES,
MATERIALS ON THE JURISDICTIONAL IMMIuTIEs OF STATES AND THEIR PROPERTY at 557, U.N. Doc.
STILEG/SER.B/20, U.N. Sales No. E/F.81.V.10 (1982). The Restatementdescribes foreign state immunity
as "an undisputed principle of customary international law." RESTATMENT (THIRD), supra note 69, at 390.
156. No government commenting on the International Law Commission's Draft Articles has suggested
otherwise, and governments commonly refer to the international law standard to justify their efforts to
restrict foreign state immunity. The drafters of the FSIA, for example, portrayed the Act as a codification
of the restrictive theory of foreign state immunity "as presently recognized in international law." House
REPORT, supra note 4, at 6605; see also Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Sovereign Immunity as a Norm of International
Law, in TANSNATIONALLAWI NA CHANGING SOCiETY 188, 194 (Wolfgang Friedmann etal. eds., 1972).
157. As Professor Crawford has noted, foreign state immunity is
a well-established technique of deference ... with which courts and States are reasonably
familiar, and one whose outright abolition would undoubtedly cause serious concern to many
States .... [C]ertainly [the doctrine] is better developed and more certain than the vague,
conflicting and disputable act of State and non-justiciability rules with which the United States
Supreme Court and English House of Lords have been grappling in recent years.
CRAWFORD, supra note 8, at 81. Similarly, Professor Brownlie applies the foreign state immunity rubric
to his recommendation of competence-based rules, relying upon the fact that all states appear to embrace
the doctrine of foreign state immunity. Unfortunately, however, Professor Brownlie has not explained how
a court would determine whether a particular transaction is "commercial," reasoning that "[diefinitions tend
to be obvious, as far as they go, without providing any real assistance in the characterisation of the more
difficult sets of facts." Brownlie, supra note 10, at 72.
158. ChiefJustice Marshall concluded that all sovereigns consent to a relaxation in their absolutejuris-
diction over their territories, because their "mutual benefit is promoted by intercourse with each other, and
by an interchange ofthose good offices which humanity dictates and its wants require." The Schooner Exch.
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the vagaries of "sovereignty" and the formalism of the private person test have
obfuscated its importance in recent U.S. court decisions.
A. Diplomatic Immunity Compared
Notions of diplomatic immunity, from which Chief Justice Marshall derived
the immunity of the state itself, are unequivocally premised on functional
necessity. While the stated rationale for diplomatic immunity has been refined
considerably in recent years, the doctrine has existed from "time immemori-
al."" 9 The earliest rationale for diplomatic immunity, now uniformly reject-
ed, was the fiction of extraterritoriality: receiving state jurisdiction must be
limited because the ambassador and embassy premises were, as a legal matter,
on foreign territory." ° A second theory, that of "representative character,"
regarded the ambassador as the personal representative of the foreign sover-
eign; any insult to the ambassador was thus a slight to the personal dignity of
the sovereign.6 Like extraterritoriality, the "representative character" theory
is no longer considered adequate to explain the rules of diplomatic immuni-
ty. 16
2
The modern rationale for diplomatic immunity, as reflected in the 1961
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations," is the notion of "functional
necessity," whereby receiving states accord immunity when necessary to avoid
interference with the functions of the diplomatic mission of a foreign state. 1"
v. M'Fadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). The Legal Adviser to the Department of State likewise
explained, when testifying in support of the FSIA, that:
The purpose of sovereign immunity in modem international law is not to protect the sensitivities
of 19th-century monarchs or the prerogatives of the 20th-century state. Rather, it is to promote
the functioning of all governments by protecting a state from the burden of defending law suits
abroad which are based on its public acts.
1976 Hearings, supra note 36, at 27 (testimony of Monroe Leigh, Legal. Adviser, Department of State).
159. SATow's GUImE TO DIPLOMATIc PRAcTICE 106 (Gore-Booth ed., 5th ed. 1979) [hereinafter
SATOW]. These fundamental rules include the inviolability of the ambassador's person and the special
protection accorded to diplomatic messages.
160. See, e.g., SATOW, supra note 159,-at 107; IV EmBR DE VATrEL, LAW OF NATIoNs §§ 92, 117
(Charles G. Fenwick, ed. 1916); but see Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 129, 157, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/98 [hereinafter 1956 IL. C. Report] (noting that "the scope of the
exemption which [diplomatic immunity] would allow is never accepted in actual practice"). For example,
diplomats must respect local law. If they engage in professional or commercial activity or personal real
estate transactions in the receiving state, they enjoy no immunity. Id. at 157-58; see also Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 31, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3240, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, 112 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention].
161. B. SEN, A DIPLOMAT'S HANDBOoK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 97 (3d ed. 1988).
162. Id. at 97; 1956 I.. C. Report, supra note 160, at 159.
163. Vienna Convention, supra note 160.
164. Id., pmbl., cl. 4, 500 U.N.T.S. at 95 (stating that diplomatic privileges and immunities are
intended "not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic
missions as representing States"). This view has been given increased prominence in the wake of events
undermining public support for diplomatic immunity. See, e.g, Diplomatic Crimes Legislation: Hearing
before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1987) (testimony of Selwa
Roosevelt, Chief of Protocol) (immunity permits diplomats "to work in an environment of freedom,
519
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This doctrine thus balances the competing interests of the receiving state and
the sending state. Full criminal immunity for diplomatic personnel reflects an
international consensus that diplomatic functions of all states would be at risk
if diplomats faced real or trumped-up charges by a receiving state. On the
other hand, the narrow exceptions to immunity from civil jurisdiction, such
as the exception for certain local real property transactions, permit the receiv-
ing state to exercise jurisdiction in cases in which local interests are significant
and risks of interference in the functions of the sending state are minimal, so
that a private action against the foreign diplomat would not seriously threaten
the diplomatic system.
The functional approach to diplomatic immunity reflected in the Vienna
Convention enjoys almost universal acceptance. 165 The common under-
standing of the functions of a diplomatic mission, specifically enumerated in
the Convention,'66 facilitates this harmony. The Convention's rather clearly
and comprehensively specified rules make the outcome of immunity questions
more predictable, and reciprocity concerns act as a major constraint on the
activities of both receiving and sending states, stabilizing the system. The
success of these diplomatic immunity rules suggests that an expressly functional
approach would work effectively in foreign state immunity law.
B. Foreign State Immunity: Balancing Competing United States Interests
There exists no agreed list of government functions comparable to the
Vienna Convention's list of diplomatic functions. Instead, contemporary
notions of foreign state immunity have evolved against a backdrop of widely
varying political and economic roles for government, both in theory and in
practice. When it abandoned the absolute theory of foreign state immunity, the
United States adopted an approach that:
[sought] to accommodate the interests of individuals doing business with foreign
governments in having their legal rights determined by the courts, with the interest
of foreign governments in being free to perform certain political acts without
undergoing the embarrassment or hindrance of defending the propriety of such acts
before foreign courts.'67
independence, and security [and] was not designed to benefit individuals but rather to ensure the efficient
performance of the functions of the mission').
165. There are currently over 156 parties to the Vienna Convention. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
TREATIES IN FORCE 310 (1992); see also Philip R. Trimble, InternationalLaw, World Order, and Critical
Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REv. 811, 836 (1990) (noting universality of diplomatic law may derive not
only from comparable functions performed by diplomatic missions throughout world, but also from exis-
tence of "subculture of diplomats, with similar training, outlook, and interests.").
166. See Vienna Convention, supra note 160, art. 3.
167. Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354,
360 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). As suggested earlier, "embarrassment" to foreign
states no longer forms a sound basis for according immunity. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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The interests on one side of this balance-those of private individuals and
entities that do business with foreign governments-explain why the United
States abandoned absolute immunity. This set of interests is often described
as "fairness to plaintiffs,""16 a phrase that offers a sense of ideological neu-
trality, suggesting merely that those dealing with foreign states deserve their
day in court. In allowing suits against foreign states, however, the restrictive
theory advances more than the interests of individual U.S. plaintiffs. The
elimination of immunity promotes the security of contract and minimizes
disruption in the normal rules of the marketplace, and thus furthers more
broadly the interests of the U.S. economic and political system.
What of the other side of the balance? How should courts weigh the interest
in permitting actions against foreign governments against the need to protect
from interference those functions of foreign governments that the court in
Victory Transport called "political acts?"' 69 Although we usually speak in
terms of balancing the interests of U.S. plaintiffs against those of foreign
governments, the FSIA also balances the U.S. interest in permitting U.S.
plaintiffs to sue against other interests of the United States government. Two
important considerations modulate the U.S. desire to permit normal operation
of market mechanisms, including the eventual resort to litigation. The first is
reciprocity: how would U.S. exercise of jurisdiction affect the United States
as a putative defendant in foreign courts?1 70 The second is the foreign policy
risk of the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction. This risk increases if the United States
applies rules of foreign state immunity that conflict with international law, or
that lack the predictability necessary to enable both foreign states and private
actors to take them into account in planning their activities.' 7'
Courts applying the FSIA seemingly have lost sight of these justifications
underlying the restrictive theory. Current law pits the U.S. interest in exercis-
ing jurisdiction against the foreign state's interest in "sovereignty," a concept
that fails to assist courts to develop immunity standards. The present commer-
168. The Legal Adviser to the State Department testified to Congress that the "general purpose" of
the FSIA was to "assure that American citizens are not deprived of normal legal redress against foreign
states who engage in ordinary commercial transactions or who otherwise act as a private person would."
1976 Hearings, supra note 27, at 24 (testimony of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, State Department). See
also The I Congreso del Partido, [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 23 (Eng. C.A.), aff'd, [1981] 2 All E.R. 1064,
1070 (H.L.) ("It is necessary in the interest ofjustice to individuals having transactions with states to allow
them to bring such transactions before the court."), noted in 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 402 (1982).
169. Victory Transport, 336 F.2d at 360.
170. The reciprocity implications of limiting foreign state immunity were among the reasons for the
State Department's move to the restrictive theory, including the practice of not claiming immunity for U.S.
merchant ships abroad and of subjecting the U.S. government to the jurisdiction of federal courts. See 26
DEP'T. ST. BULL. 984, 985 (1952).
171. The State Department has recently found it necessary to participate in an increasing number of
FSIA cases on these grounds. See generally Carolyn J. Brock, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act:
Defining a Role for the Executive, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 795 (1990) (discussing reasons for Executive Branch
intervention in FSIA cases, including Gregorian, Practical Concepts, and Millen).
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cial activity exception invites no judicial inquiry into the reciprocity implica-
tions of an exercise of jurisdiction or into a decision's potential inconsistency
with international law. Moreover, because the Act leaves all difficult decisions
to the courts, it fails to produce predictable results and thus increases the
likelihood that actions against foreign states will have adverse foreign policy
consequences.
A fluid notion of commercial activity may have seemed desirable to
Congress when it attempted the first national codification of restrictive immuni-
ty. However, following fifteen years of experience under the Act, the enact-
ment of statutes by a number of other states that also follow a restrictive theory
of immunity, and several international efforts to codify the restrictive theo-
ry,172 we now have sufficient experience to overhaul the FSIA.
Any revision of the FSIA must begin with the recognition that no formula
can easily replace the FSIA's nature/purpose distinction. The vexing problem
of distinguishing commercial activities from immune transactions will exist so
long as the United States wishes to permit its courts to exercise jurisdiction
over some, but not all, activities of foreign states. We can, however, improve
the operation of the commercial activity exception by revising the FSIA in four
ways. First, a court should begin its assessment with an "individuation"
analysis, whereby it identifies the precise causes of action at issue, to lay the
basis for the court's consideration of personal jurisdiction and determination
of immunity. Second, the Act should pare back the situations in which U.S.
courts must confront the commercial/sovereign distinction, by requiring a court
to determine whether it can exercise personal jurisdiction over the foreign state
before considering whether an activity of that state is "commercial." Third,
in lieu of the existing single definition of commercial activity, the statute
should enumerate specific exceptions to immunity, based upon those incorpo-
rated in other restrictive immunity statutes, international codifications, and
cases that have arisen under the FSIA. Finally, the Act should expressly direct
courts to consider the functional interests balanced by the FSIA in cases that
fall outside of the enumerated exceptions, rather than leaving them to flounder
with the commercial/sovereign distinction.
1. Individuation of Each Cause of Action
Under the prevailing "private person test," a court defines the relevant
activity and then asks whether a private person could engage in that activity.
172. See, e.g., European Convention on State Immunity, May 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 470 (1972); 1991
LLC. Report, supra note 2. In addition to these efforts, the Institute for International Law has adopted
a resolution on the jurisdictional immunities of states. See 1991 I.I.L. Resolution, supra note 14. The
International Law Association also adopted a draft convention on state immunity in 1982, reprinted in
BADR, supra note 9, at 231.
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Because there exist no guidelines directing a court to the "relevant" aspect of
an activity, and because designation of an aspect as "relevant" can be disposi-
tive of a case, the private person test offers no real standards for the immunity
determination. As a first step towards filling this gap, a revised FSIA should
expressly require courts to begin their immunity analysis by "isolat[ing] those
specific acts of the named defendant that form the basis of the plaintiff's
suit."173 This inquiry, which Professor Crawford calls "individuation, "'7
would improve a court's analysis of minimum contacts to determine personal
jurisdiction and would provide a foundation for the determination of immunity
under either the proposed enumerated exceptions or those cases falling outside
this enumeration.
In re Sedco, Inc. 75 provides an example of the consequences of courts'
current failure to individuate the causes of action before considering immunity.
In Sedco, the district court failed to describe the plaintiffs' cause of action, and
simply concluded that immunity was warranted because "the nature of Pemex'
act in determining the extent of Mexico's natural resources was uniquely
sovereign." '176 If the court had first considered what causes of action were
before it, and had determined, for example, that plaintiffs alleged that Pemex
used faulty equipment, drilled in negligent manner, or made negligent judg-
ments in its selection of a drill site, it would have been hard-pressed to define
the cause of action as "determining the extent of. .. natural resources."
Proper individuation also would avoid the type of error evidenced by the
district court's decision in Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., where the district court
classified the activities of another foreign state entity instead of limiting itself
to the activities of the named defendant.'77 Further, individuation would
require courts to separate actionable from unactionable causes of action, such
as the claim of breach of contract and the claim of tortious injury from the
refusal to permit entry in Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp. 7 Final-
ly, individuation would keep a court's analysis on the right level, neither
considering the policies implemented by a particular transaction (such as the
management of natural resources in MOL, Inc. v. People's Republic ofBangla-
desh79), nor assessing, in a breach of contract case, the type of consideration
173. De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1391 (5th Cir. 1985); see supra
notes 75-79 and accompanying text (discussing De Sanchez).
174. Crawford, supra note 8, at 94.
175. 543 F. Supp. 561 (S.D. Tex. 1982), vacated, 610 F. Supp. 306 (S.D. Tex. 1984), remanded
on other grounds sub nor. Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat'l Oil Co., 767 F.2d 1140
(5th Cir. 1985); see supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text (discussing Sedco).
176. 543 F. Supp. at 566.
177. 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985) (summarizing unreported district court opinion).
178. 621 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1980); see supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (discussing
Arango).
179. 572 F. Supp. 79 (D. Or. 1983), aft'd, 736 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1984); see supra notes 59-66
and accompanying text (discussing MOL).
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given by a foreign state (such as the "exercises of sovereign authority" in
Millen Industries, Inc. v. Coordination Council for North American Af-
fairs'8s).
2. Determining Personal Jurisdiction Before Immunity
The FSIA's existing commercial activity exception fuses the questions of
immunity and personal jurisdiction. Courts considering claims under the FSIA
generally first assess whether a foreign state is immune and then determine
whether the defendant state has sufficient contacts with the United States to
meet one of the FSIA's three standards for personal jurisdiction.' This
approach leads to two problems. First, courts have found the Act's three
separate tests confusing."8 2 Second, by deciding immunity before determining
180. 855 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text (discussing Millen).
181. This approach was developed by the Second Circuit in Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal
Rep. of Nig., 647 F.2d 300, 308 (2d Cir. 1981); see supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text (discussing
Texas Trading). The three tests are: 1) Is the action "based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by [a] foreign state?" 2) Is the action based upon an "act performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of [a] foreign state elsewhere?" 3) Is the action based upon an act
outside the territory of the United States, in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere, yet "caus[ing] a direct effect in the United States?" 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2); see supra note 55
(quoting § 1605); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1603(e) (defining "commercial activity carried on in the United
States" as "commercial activity... having substantial contact with the United States.").
182. See generally DELLAPENNA, supra note 4, §§ 3.8-.10; Trooboff, supra note 6, at 335-351. The
district court's decision in Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Arg., 753 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), qf'd,
941 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1991), aff'd, 60 U.S.L.W. 4510 (U.S. 7une 12, 1992), illustrates one difficulty
courts face in attempting to apply the FSIA's minimum contacts requirement. Relying on Texas Trading,
the court first held that failure to make payment on bonds that called for payment in New York constituted
a "direct effect" in the United States, thereby establishing jurisdiction under the third ("direct effects")
clause of § 1605(a)(2). The court then held that the contacts possessed by Argentina and its Central Bank
with the United States were sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause,
because the defendants promised to pay in New York, maintained consulates engaged in commercial activity
throughout the United States, and maintained bank accounts in the United States. 753 F. Supp. at 1207.
As Professor Carlos Vdzquez has pointed out, this two-step approach improperly bifurcates the inquiry:
"The courts should be interpreting the direct-effect clause in light of the due process clause's minimum
contacts requirements and should find the commercial-activities exception satisfied only if the forum-related
activities on which the action is based are sufficient in themselves to satisfy due process." Carlos M.
Vdzquez, The Relationship between the FSIA's Commercial-Activities Exception and the Due-Process
Clause, 85 PROc. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 257, 259 (1991). Proper individuation in Weltover would have
avoided this problem by identifying the cause of action as a breach of obligations on bonds with which
embassy and consulate transactions have nothing to do. See Weltover, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4513 (assuming
without deciding that foreign state is "person" for purposes of Due Process Clause, and holding that
Argentina, by issuing instruments denominated in dollars and payable in New York, and by appointing
a financial agent in New York, possessed minimum contacts sufficient to satisfy constitutional test).
Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3827 (U.S.
June 9, 1992) (No. 91-522), illustrates the confusion over the first clause of section 1605(a)(2). There,
the court of appeals held that Nelson's cause of action for damages suffered during alleged detention and
torture in Saudi Arabia were "based on" his recruitment and employment in the United States. 923 F.2d
at 1533-34. Cf. Stena Rederi AB v. Comision de Contratos del Comite Ejecutivo General del Sindicato
Revolucionario de Trabajadores Petroleros de la Republica Mexicana, S.C., 923 F.2d 380, 387-88 (5th
Cir. 1991) ("The only relevant acts for purposes of jurisdiction under the FSIA are those acts that form
the basis of the plaintiff's complaint. . . ."); America W. Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d
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personal jurisdiction, courts may unnecessarily reach complex immunity
questions. A revised FSIA should therefore clarify the standards for determin-
ing personal jurisdiction. Once those standards are clarified, the Act should
also direct courts to decide personal jurisdiction before considering immuni-
ty. 183
The enumeration of specific exceptions offers a partial solution to the
existing confusion over the meaning of the FSIA's minimum contacts stan-
dards. As is done in foreign statutes,' Congress should specify for certain
kinds of cases (e.g. those relating to employment contracts, membership in
corporations, intellectual property, or taxes) what contacts with the United
States are sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. For important categories
of cases, however, (including cases for breach of contract, for supply of goods
or services or financing agreements), foreign statutes prescribe no such special
rules, relying instead on the otherwise applicable rules of the relevant
court.185 Moreover, it would not be possible to articulate specific rules to
govern cases decided under the default clause. 6 Thus, Congress will still
need to provide generally applicable standards for determining personal
jurisdiction. It could take up Peter Trooboff's suggestion to clarify its apparent
793, 796 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The commercial activity relied upon by [plaintiff] to establish jurisdiction must
be the activity upon which the lawsuit is based. . . ."); Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlman, 853 F.2d
445, 452 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[Ihe commercial activity relied upon by plaintiff... must be also the activity
upon which the lawsuit is based. .. ."); Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511, 1514 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (refusing to grant jurisdiction over breach of contract suit for work performed in Saudi Arabia
on basis of recruitment call to United States, as it "would extend [jurisdiction] to any and all disputes
between Zedan and Saudi Arabia subsequent to the phone call, merely because but for that call Zedan would
not have travelled to Saudi Arabia").
183. Ultimately, the wisdom of this proposal depends on the relative clarity of a revised commercial
activity exception and of any new minimum contacts standard. If the commercial activity exception is
revised but the existing minimum contacts standards are retained, for example, inquiry into immunity should
probably continue to precede a minimum contacts analysis.
184. Some of the enumerated exceptions in Australia's statute, for example, specify a particular nexus
to the forum state. See, e.g., Australian Immunity Act, supra note 8, § 12(1) (contracts of employment
made or to be performed in Australia), § 15 (registration or protection of invention or trademarks, or use
of a trade name "in Australia"), § 16 (membership in bodies incorporated in Australia), § 20 (obligations
imposed by Australian tax law).
185. See, e.g., Australian Immunity Act, supra note 8; State Immunity Act, 1979 (Sing.) (codified
at SING. REV. STAT., 1979 Supp. at 193), reprinted in BADR, supra note 9, App. IV [hereinafter Singapore
Immunity Act]; Foreign States Immunities Act, 1981 (S. Aft.) (codified as amended at 5 JUTA's STAT.
S. AFRICA 1-428 (1991)), reprinted in BADR, supra note 9, App. VI [hereinafter South African Immunities
Act]; State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33 (U.K.), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123 (1978) [hereinafter U.K.
Immunity Act]. Cf. State Immunity in Canadian Courts Act, 1982 (Can.) (codified at R.S.C. ch. S-18
(1985)), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 798 (1982) [hereinafter Canadian Immunity Act]. However, the U.K.
Immunity Act provides a special minimum contacts standard in the case of contracts that are not "commer-
cial transactions." The statute denies jurisdiction in such cases if contracting occurs in the territory of the
foreign state and is governed by that state's administrative law. See U.K. Immunity Act, supra, § 2.3(2).
Australia declined to copy this special rule. See AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REP. No. 24,
FOREiGN STATE IMMurnTY 92 (1984) [hereinafter LAW REFORM COMM'N REPORT]. See also 1991 LL C
Report, supra note 2, art. 10, at 70 (commentary) (stating that jurisdiction should be determined by relevant
law of forum, which may include applicable rules of private international law).
186. See infra part IV.B.4.a.
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intention to apply more restrictive minimum contacts rules to foreign states
than those applicable to other foreign defendants.'87 Alternatively, Congress
might adopt Professor Dellapenna's recommendation that the minimum contacts
standards for foreign states be premised on the rules of private international
law."'8 The choice between these two options illustrates that elaboration of
a minimum contacts rule, like the immunity determination, requires a careful
balancing of competing U.S. interests, which is best performed in a legislative
setting.
In addition to clarifying the minimum contacts standards, Congress should
direct courts to determine whether they have personal jurisdiction before
considering immunity. This change would bring U.S. law into conformity with
international trends."8 9 More important, personal jurisdiction analysis is likely
to remain more familiar to U.S. courts than immunity determinations, particu-
larly if the FSIA's minimum contacts standards are clarified. An amendment
that requires a court to determine personal jurisdiction before reaching the
question of immunity may therefore avoid needless immunity determina-
tions. 190
3. Experience-Based Exceptions to Immunity
Courts should turn to the question of immunity only after they have proper-
ly individuated the causes of action and established that they have personal
jurisdiction. As the earlier discussion of cases demonstrated, the FSIA current-
ly fails to provide a workable definition of commercial activity, leading to
unpredictable results. A revised FSIA should enumerate types of transactions
that constitute commercial activities in order to clarify the immunity determina-
tion.
Of the states codifying the restrictive theory of foreign state immunity since
1976, only Canada has copied the oblique definition of commercial activity
187. Trooboff, supra note 6, at 350-51. Trooboff concludes that a special nexus test fir foreign states
may be appropriate, given the breadth ofjurisdiction that has been permitted under the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 343.
188. DELLAIENNA, supra note 4, § 3.10; see also id. § 3.2 (FSIA personal jurisdiction determination
should be based on international law notion of "objective territorial jurisdiction," which permits exercise
of jurisdiction with respect to acts that take place outside forum state but cause substantial effect on people
or things within that state).
189. See 1991 LL C. Report, supra note 2, art. 10, at 70 (commentary) (stating that application of
jurisdictional immunities "presupposes the existence ofjurisdiction"); see also BADR, supra note 9, at 84-5
(advocating this approach).
190. If a court finds that it does have personal jurisdiction, it will not escape consideration of
immunity. The difficult immunity determinations discussed in Part III above, for example, could not have
been avoided even if jurisdiction had been considered first, because it does not appear that the exercise
of personal jurisdiction was, or would have been, inappropriate in those cases. In many other cases,
however, courts have dismissed cases against foreign states for lack of sufficient contacts with the United
States. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 4, §§ 3.8-.10.
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found in the FSIA. 19 1 States instead generally identify "specific categories
or classes of cases that have arisen in practice and fashion rules for each such
category[,] taking into account the reasons for according immunity or for
asserting jurisdiction in that specific context."192 These statutes eschew inqui-
ry into the nature of activities and avoid the question whether the private
person test speaks to the subject matter of an activity or to its judicial form.
Thus, statutes containing enumerated exceptions reflect legislative determina-
tions that, in some cases, a court should look first to theforn of a transaction
(e.g., a contract for goods or services) to determine whether to grant immuni-
ty, whereas in other cases the identities of the plaintiff and the foreign state
defendant might be dispositive (e.g., specific rules for different kinds of
employment contracts). Unlike the FSIA's commercial activity exception, such
statutes promote predictability and embody the results of legislative consider-
ation of reciprocity and consistency with international law.
The Australian Immunity Act provides a workable model for any revisions
to the FSIA.1 93 That statute, like the FSIA, recognizes that foreign states are
immune subject to specific exceptions.194 Several provisions parallel excep-
tions found in the FSIA, 195 but others detail specific exceptions that the Act
addresses only generally under the commercial activity exception.196
The Australian Immunity Act defines a commercial transaction as:
[A] commercial, trading, business, professional or industrial or like transaction into
which the foreign State has entered or a like activity in which the State has engaged
[including] (a) a contract for the supply of goods or services; (b) an agreement for
a loan or some other transaction for or in respect of the provision of finance; and
(c) a guarantee or indemnity in respect of a financial obligation, but does not include
a contract of employment or a bill of exchange. 1
191. See Canadian Immunity Act, supra note 185, § 3; cf. Australian Immunity Act, supra note 8;
Singapore Immunity Act, supra note 185, § 4; South African Immunities Act, supra note 185, § 3; U.K.
Immunity Act, supra note 185, § 2.
192. LAW REFoRM CoMM'I REPORT, supra note 185, 52.
193. Id. 64-65. In drafting Australia's statute, the Australian Law Reform Commission considered
the respective merits of other formulations, including the FSIA and the U.K. Immunity Act. In choosing
to model Australia's statute after the U.K. Immunity Act the Commission rejected the 'hallowed'
nature/purpose distinction. It found that "[i]t is not possible to classify the 'nature' of the transaction without
reference to its purpose. The nature of an activity is not some abstract human idea (certainly not for legal
purposes) .... The classifications 'governmental' and 'commercial' are themselves purposive." Id. 49.
194. Australian Immunity Act, supra note 8, § 9.
195. These include denial of immunity in cases in which the foreign state has waived its immunity,
id. § 10; in certain tort cases, iL § 13; with respect to certain real property transactions, gifts and
succession, id. § 14; and with respect to arbitration agreements and arbitralawards, id. § 17. Cf. 28 U.S.C.
§9 1605(a)(l)-(6) (1988).
196. These include contracts of employment, Australian Immunity Act, supra note 8, § 12;bankruptcy
proceedings, id. § 14(3); intellectual property, id. § 15; membership in corporations and similar associa-
tions, id. § 16; bills of exchange, id. § 19; taxes, id. § 20; and "commercial transactions," id. § 11. The
Australian Immunity Act, like the FSIA, also governs service of process on foreign states, Id. §§ 23-26,
and accords immunity from execution subject to certain exceptions, id. §§ 30-35.
197. Id. § 11(3). The U.K. Immunity Act, unlike the Australian Immunity Act, denies immunity in
proceedings relating to contracts for the supply of goods and services, financing transactions, guarantee
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A court assessing immunity under the Australian Act thus would deny immuni-
ty in cases like MOL, Inc. v. People's Republic of Bangladesh", and Practi-
cal Concepts, Inc. v. Republic of Bolivia,'" even if the contract in question
included terms "that only a government could offer and perform."2I It would
also deny immunity with respect to the issuance of public debt in Republic of
Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.20
The Australian Immunity Act excludes employment contracts from the defi-
nition of "commercial transactions" by addressing them separately. In drafting
the provision for employment contracts, the Law Reform Commission consid-
ered
the range of factors which are relevant to assessing the competing interests of
foreign and forum state. These include where the contract is made, where it is to
be performed and where it is breached; whether the employee is a national of
Australia, or of the foreign state; whether the employee is permanently or ordinarily
resident in Australia, and perhaps whether the work to be performed is 'govern-
mental' or whether the aspect of the employment contract in dispute is of a 'govern-
mental' or 'commercial' nature. To illustrate this last point it is arguable that the
foreign state's interest in exclusive jurisdiction is greater where the employee is a
head of diplomatic mission than where the work is of an ordinary clerical na-
ture.
202
and indemnity transactions, and "any other transaction or activity (whether of a commercial, industrial,
financial, professional or other similar character) into which a State enters or in which it engages otherwise
than in the exercise of sovereign authority." U.K. Immunity Act, supra note 185, § 2(3)(c) (emphasis
added). The Law Reform Commission deleted this last phrase from the Australian statute, noting that it
had been criticized as impossible to define, and concluded that the effect of this deletion was likely to be
slight given the breadth of the enumerated transactions. LAW REFORM COMM'N REPORT, supra note 185,
92 (citing Ian M. Sinclair, The European Convention on State Immunity, 22 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 254,
278 (1973)).
198. 572 F. Supp. 79 (D. Or. 1983), af'd, 736 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1984); see supra notes 59-66
and accompanying text (discussing MOL).
199. 613 F. Supp. 863 (D.D.C.), aff'd on reh'g, 615 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd, 811 F.2d
1543 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text (discussing Practical Concepts).
200. 811 F.2d at 1548 n.9.
201. 60 U.S.L.W. 4510 (U.S. June 12, 1992); see supra notes 102-105 (discussing Weltover).
The ABA in 1985 supported an amendment to the commercial activity exception to provide that
.commercial activity" includes "any promise to pay made by a foreign state, any debt security issued by
a foreign state, and any guarantee by a foreign state of a promise to pay made by another party." See S.
1071, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 3137, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). See also Mark B. Feldman,
Amending the Foreign Sovereign ImmunitiesAct: The ABA Position, 20 INT'L LAw. 1289, 1290-91 (1986).
The Executive Branch opposed the amendment, see Arbitral Awards: Hearing on H.R. 3106, 3137, H.R.
4342, and H.R. 4592 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 73, 77 (1985) (testimony and statement of Elizabeth G.
Verville, Acting Legal Adviser, State Department), and the measure was ultimately unsuccessful. More
recently, the Executive Branch indicated that "the issuance of... debt instruments, like the issuance of
promissory notes, mortgages, and commercial paper, is by its nature a commercial activity," but stopped
short of endorsing a blanket rule that the issuance of public debt is per se commercial, noting that
transactions between two central banks might not constitute commercial activity. Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 13 & n.9, Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 60 U.S.L.W.
4510 (U.S. June 12, 1992) (No. 91-763). Some foreign statutes address this possibility by excluding
agreements between states from statutory exceptions for "commercial transactions." See, e.g, Australian
Immunity Act, supra note 8, § 11(2)(a)(i).
202. LAw REFORM COMM'N REPORT, supra note 185, 95.
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The statute adopts a general rule that a foreign state is not immune in an action
based on an employment contract made in Australia or to be performed in
whole or in part in Australia: This rule does not apply if the plaintiff is a
national of the foreign state but not a permanent resident of Australia, or if
the plaintiff is a habitual resident of the foreign state. The statute also does not
apply to diplomatic and consular personnel, with the exception of support staff
who are citizens or permanent residents of Australia.' °3
The Australian Immunity Act's employment contracts provision thus
minimizes potential interference with the foreign state's functions by demarcat-
ing protected and unprotected categories. As the Law Reform Commission
explained, the forum state's interest in exercising jurisdiction is greatest in
cases that involve the least sensitive categories of employees, those "who are
also, perhaps, most in need of protection."2" The detail contained in the
employment contracts provision of the Australian Immunity Act therefore
constitutes a marked improvement over the FSIA, and such enumeration should
be included in any revision of the Act.2°' Specific rules that also reflect the
respective interests of the forum and foreign states could be developed to
address unionization disputes like those in State Bank of India v. NLRB, 2°
Goethe House, N.Y., German Cultural Center v. NLRB,2O 7 and Public Ser-
vice Alliance."8 As with the U.K. and Australian statutes, a revised commer-
cial activity exception should also contain detailed provisions addressing
immunity for other specified causes of action, such as those relating to intellec-
203. Id. 100 (discussing diplomatic and consular employees).
204. Id.
205. By contrast, the private person test fails to offer courts any real guidance to a court considering
an action against a foreign state for breach of an employment contract. If a court applies the juridical
relationship variant of the private person test, it will deny immunity in all such cases. If a court applies
the subject matter variant, however, the outcome will be dictated by the court's definition of the relevant
activity, an exercise for which the statute offers no guidance. See supra notes 106-112 and accompanying
text (discussing Segni v. Commercial Office of Spain, 835 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1987)).
An amendment to the FSIA therefore could also take account of the fact that the exercise ofjurisdiction
may not itself interfere unduly with the foreign state's functions, but that a particular remedy might. For
example, the Australian Immunity Act limits the remedy available in employment cases by excluding
reinstatement orders. Australian Immunity Act, supra note 8, § 29(2). Such an amendment would be
especially appropriate in areas with potentially extensive internal ramifications for the foreign state, e.g.,
unionization disputes.
206. 808 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1986); see supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text (discussing State
Bank of India).
207. 685 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), rev'd, 869 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1989); see supra notes 72-74
and accompanying text (discussing Goethe House).
208. United States v. Public Serv. Alliance of Can., No. 21,641 (Can.) (May 21, 1992) (on file with
author); see supra notes 116-117, 124-130 and accompanying text (discussing Public Service Alliance).
The Australian Immunity Act addresses this issue because it applies not only to actions for breach of an
employment contract, but also to "any proceeding concerning the employment of a person under a contract
of employment." Australian Immunity Act, supra note 8, § 29. The Law Reform Commission explained
that the provision was intended to apply "to all relations between the employer and employee." LAW
REFORM COMM'N REPORT, supra note 185, 99. The employee should be able to sue the employer "over
any rights or duties imposed by law on an employer or employee in respect of the employment relationship,
including pension rights arising under such a contract."
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tual property, 2" membership in corporations and like associations, 210 and
taxes.
211
Unlike the Australian statute, however, a revised FSIA should group all
such exceptions together in a single section. This structure would recognize
the common functional underpinnings of the various exceptions, balance the
U.S. interest in exercising jurisdiction against its interest in according immuni-
ty, and consider the need to be consistent with international law and the
importance of producing predictable judicial decisions.2 The enumerated
exceptions would give effect to this balancing in such diverse situations as
contracts for the sale of goods and the unionization of foreign state employees.
For cases that were not anticipated in the enumeration, the enumerated excep-
tions might also provide guidance to courts by analogy, which would assist in
the application of the default clause discussed below.213
209. Both the Australian and the U.K. statutes deny immunity in cases concerning infringement
protection and disputed ownership of copyrights, patents, trademarks, and inventions in the forum state.
Australian Immunity Act, supra note 8, § 15; U.K. Immunity Act, supra note 185, § 7. The Australian
statute, however, recognizes immunity in cases involving the possession or use of intellectual property
outside a "commercial transaction." LAW REFORM COMM'N REPORT, supra note 185, 103.
210. Both statutes contain provisions denying a foreign state immunity for actions relating to its
membership in a corporation, unincorporated body, or partnership that has members other than foreign
states and that is constituted in or controlled from the host country. Australian Immunity Act, supra note
8, § 16; U.K. Immunity Act, supra note 185, § 8.
211. The U.K. statute denies immunity from liability in proceedings regarding certain specified taxes,
including customs duties, value added taxes, excise taxes, and agricultural levies. U.K. Immunity Act,
supra note 185, § 11. The Australian statute goes further: if an Australian tax statute applies to an activity
engaged in by a foreign state, the foreign state cannot obtain immunity from a suit to collect the tax.
Australian Immunity Act, supra note 8, § 20. See LAW REFORM COMM'N REPORT, supra note 185, 112
(noting that *question is properly one of the scope of Australian taxation legislation, not of foreign state
immunity').
Only the Australian statute specifically deals with bills of exchange, denying immunity in any proceed-
ing concerning a bill of exchange drawn, made, or endorsed by the foreign state in connection with a
transaction as to which the state is not entitled to immunity. Australian Immunity Act, supra note 8, § 19.
(Under U.S. law a "bill of exchange" is commonly referred to as a "draft." See U.C.C. § 3-104 commen-
tary at 344 (1990)). Thus, for example, the Australian statute would deny immunity in a case like De
Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985), in which the underlying transaction
was the certificates of deposit that the plaintiff redeemed in exchange for the check. In other cases, such
as government payments of tax refunds, there would be no comparable underlying commercial transaction,
and immunity would be granted. (The author is grateful to Professor James Crawford for providing this
clarification.) A comparable provision would be a useful addition to a revised FSIA.
212. See supra notes 167-172 and accompanying text.
213. By contrast, the default clause of the U.K. Immunity Act and its progeny appears within the
'commercial transaction" exception. See Australian Immunity Act, supra note 8, § 11(3) (stating 'com-
mercial transaction' means a commercial, trading, business, professional or industrial or like transaction
into which the foreign State has entered or a like activity in which the State has engaged, but does not
include a contract of employment or a bill of exchange.); U.K. Immunity Act, supra note 185, § 3(3)(c)
(denying immunity for "any other transaction or activity (whether of a commercial, industrial, financial,
professional or other similar character)') (emphasis added). Such a structure limits a court's consideration
of "like transactions' to those listed in the definition of "commercial transaction," at the exclusion of the
other enumerated exceptions of those statutes.
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4. Undue Interference in the Functions of the Foreign State
Legislative enumeration of exceptions to immunity would improve the
predictability of U.S. court decisions, and would increase the likelihood that
those decisions will strike the intended balance among competing U.S. inter-
ests. It is impossible, however, to foresee all categories of cases in which
questions of foreign state immunity might arise. A revised FSIA should there-
fore direct a court to apply a functional approach to the immunity determi-
nation if it concludes that the enumerated categories do not apply to the case
at hand.2 14
The FSIA could simply extend immunity in all cases that fall outside the
enumerated exceptions. This would increase predictability and greatly reduce
the risk of results that conflict with international law or with U.S. reciprocity
interests. Such an immunity rule, however, would deny private parties access
to U.S. courts-the very interest that caused Congress to adopt the restrictive
theory in the FSIA. At the other extreme, the Act could be amended to extend
the jurisdiction of U.S. courts to all cases outside the enumerated exceptions
if the court would have jurisdiction in an action against a private defendant.
This option would give primacy to the U.S. interests in protecting U.S. plain-
tiffs and permitting cases to proceed in U.S. courts, but would greatly curtail
judicial consideration of international law and reciprocity and would reverse
the FSIA's stated presumption of immunity. Despite the fact that such extreme
rules might produce consistent, predictable results, then, neither is satisfactory.
A revised FSIA therefore must include a default provision defining the statuto-
ry standard applicable to cases falling outside the enumerated categories.
Other statutes offer no more guidance than the present FSIA for such
cases. 211 This lack of additional guidance may be warranted, because the
number of cases falling outside the enumerated exceptions is likely to be small
and a generally applicable formula that would improve on the nature/purpose
distinction has eluded commentators, courts, and legislators.216 The unantici-
pated and novel cases falling outside the enumerated categories, however, will
be most difficult for courts to assess. A revised FSIA could improve consider-
ably on the default clauses of foreign statutes in two ways. First, the Act
should expressly require a court to balance the interests advanced by the
commercial activity exception through a default clause that applies if no
214. These enumerated exceptions would not, for example, address the misrepresentation claim in
Millen Indus., Inc. v. Coordination Council for N. Am. Affairs, 855 F.2d 879 (D.C.Cir. 1988), the libel
claim in Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891 (1989), or the tort
claims in In re Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561 (S.D. Tex. 1982), vacated, 610 F. Supp. 306 (S.D. Tex.
1984), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Nat'l Oil Co., 767 F.2d
1140 (5th Cir. 1985).
215. See supra note 213.
216. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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enumerated category applies to the cause of action. Second, the Act should
expressly address some of the most difficult commercial activity cases-tort
cases with an alleged nexus to a commercial activity.
a. Advancing the Functional Standard Through a Default Clause
A default clause incorporated in the new commercial activity exception
would provide courts with a standard to guide their judgment on whether a
particular activity is commercial. Rather than relying on the commercial/sov-
ereign distinction or the private person test, this determination must direct
courts to balance the various, and sometimes competing, interests underlying
the commercial activity exception. In particular, the default clause should
provide that a foreign state shall not be immune with respect to any cause of
action 1) that satisfies the applicable minimum contacts standard, 2) as to
which the exercise of jurisdiction would not be inconsistent with international
law,217 and 3) that it is based on an activity that, although not encompassed
within the enumerated exceptions, should be classified as a commercial activi-
ty, giving consideration to whether the exercise of jurisdiction would unduly
interfere with the functions of the foreign state. In order to decide whether
interference is "undue," a court must consider whether the exercise ofjurisdic-
tion demands review of the content or conduct of foreign government policies,
for which immunity is appropriate, or over the modalities by which the foreign
state has implemented those policies. If a cause of action arises out of a
modality, the court should balance the extent and significance of the U.S.
interest in exercising jurisdiction against the implications to reciprocity, taldng
into account U.S. law governing actions against the U.S. government in
domestic courts, and assertions of immunity by the U.S. government in foreign
courts.
2 18
217. While U.S. courts must construe statutes to be consistent with international law, Murray v. The
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804), few statutes define the authority of the U.S.
government by express reference to international law. (One such statute is the "Pelly Amendment," 22
U.S.C. § 1978(a) (1988), which authorizes the imposition of trade sanctions on foreign governments that
have acted in ways inconsistent with stated conservation standards "to the extent ... sanctioned by the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.') An express reference to the international law standard would
be particularly appropriate in a revised FSIA, where a court's decision could place the United States in
violation of international law.
218. While courts would address most contract cases through the enumerated exceptions, many
commercial tort cases would need to be resolved under the default commercial activity exception. This
exception also would apply in many cases in which the foreign state is subject to administrative proceedings
in the forum state, as occurs in cases involving unionization or the application of U.S. environmental law
to foreign state instrumentalities. The FSIA currently does not expressly address what law applies to
immunity determinations by U.S. agencies, or how those agencies should obtain jurisdiction over foreign
states. Any amendment to the Act should clarify that the same immunity standards apply in all U.S agency
proceedings. See 1991 I.I.L Resolution, supra note 14, art. 11(2) (noting immunity criteria extend to all
"organs of the forum state," not just courts). A revision of the FSIA should also clarify rules governing
service of process in administrative proceedings.
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Several aspects of this proposal deserve comment. First, this proposal
would permit a suit to proceed if the exercise of jurisdiction is "not inconsis-
tent with international law." The use of this awkward phrase is deliberate. The
doctrine of foreign state immunity in international law currently is in a state
of flux. There exists no widely accepted international agreement on the subject,
and state practice remains sporadic and difficult to compile. Thus, neither a
plaintiff nor a court should be required to demonstrate affirmatively that
international law permits the exercise of jurisdiction in a particular case. On
the other hand, if a court concludes that international law would bar U.S.
jurisdiction, the revised statute should require it to dismiss the case.
Second, a finding of personal jurisdiction over the defendant constitutes
a finding that the cause of action bears a sufficient relationship to the United
States for a U.S. court to exercise jurisdiction. That a relationship meets this
test, however, does not mean that U.S. interests in exercising jurisdiction are
so strong that immunity should be denied. Rather, for a court to balance the
interest in exercising jurisdiction against other interests implicated by the
immunity determination, it must inquire more closely into the extent and nature
of the U.S. interest.
Third, this proposal would ask courts to distinguish between the content
and the conduct of foreign government policies and the modalities of imple-
mentation of those policies. Professor Brownlie, in his work as Rapporteur of
the Institute of International Law's project on foreign state immunity, draws
this useful distinction between the content of a foreign state's policies and the
modalities of implementation.219 Foreign state immunity cases often arise in
situations of extreme national importance, such as the debt crisis in Republic
of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.," the collapse of the Somoza regime and
attendant run on the Nicaraguan treasury in De Sanchez v. Banco Central de
Nicaragua," or the ambitious development program in Texas Trading &
Milling, Inc. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria.'2 In none of these cases, how-
ever, did the plaintiff request the district court to adjudicate the content of the
foreign state's policies. Rather, in each case the plaintiff challenged conven-
tional mechanisms or "modalities" (bonds, a check, and contracts and letters
of credit, respectively) by which the defendant state implemented its policies.
The proposed policy/modality distinction thus reinforces the importance of
individuation, because actionable conduct normally depends upon injury from
219. Brownlie, supra note 10, at 64 (emphasis in original). Professoi Brownlie concludes that the
"content, conduct and precise implementation of the foreign and defence policies of foreign States are
matters outside the competence of the legal system of the forum State." Id. (emphasis added). The cases
discussed here demonstrate that the policy/modality distinction applies with equal force to matters of
domestic policy.
220. 60 U.S.L.W. 4510 (U.S. June 12, 1992).
221. 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985).
222. 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cen. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
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use of a particular modality rather than the policy it implements. For example,
the cause of action in Millen Industries, Inc. v. Coordination Councilfor North
American Affairs arose not from Taiwan's policy of waiving certain duties for
foreign investors, but rather from the alleged breach of a contractual obligation
to extend such treatment.223
Fourth, the statute would require courts to consider the reciprocity implica-
tions of a decision whether to exercise jurisdiction. Congress, not the courts,
is best equipped to consider general reciprocity implications of the denial of
immunity, as when it develops the enumerated exceptions in the FSIA. None-
theless, the Act should direct courts to consider reciprocity, given the impor-
tant implications of any immunity decision. United States law regarding the
immunity of the United States from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts provides
one rough but accessible measure of reciprocity; if the United States has not
waived its own immunity from suit, it follows a fortiori that the United States
would oppose a foreign court's adjudication of such a claim against the United
States. 4 Assessment of U.S. practice overseas is more difficult, and there-
fore a court may wish to obtain information from the Executive Branch in
cases with uncertain reciprocity implications. While this could lead to a
expanded role for the Executive Branch (apparently undermining the FSIA's
objective of shifting immunity determinations from the Executive Branch to
the courts-), the proposed revisions to the FSIA generally would reduce
rather than increase overall Executive Branch involvement in foreign state
immunity cases. 6 Moreover, the Executive Branch's views on reciprocity
would address an issue peculiarly within its area of expertise, while courts
would retain the final decision on immunity in individual cases.
Finally, a commercial activity exception that simply denied immunity for
all cases outside the enumerated exceptions would be easier to apply than one
containing the proposed default provision. The revisions proposed here are
intended to reduce the need to resort to a default provision. If unexpected cases
223. 855 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Courts often confuse the modality of implementing a policy with
the policy itself. For example, the Ninth Circuit characterized the cause of action in MOL, Inc. v. People's
Rep. ofBangl., 736 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1984), as concerning regulation of natural resources, not a contract
for the sale of monkeys.
224. The converse, however, is not true. There may be areas where the United States would be willing
to grant its own courts jurisdiction but would be unwilling to accept the jurisdiction of foreign courts.
225. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
226. In the past few years, the Executive Branch has filed amicus curiae briefs in numerous cases,
most recently in Weltover. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Republic
of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 60 U.S.L.W. 4510 (U.S. June 12, 1992) (No. 91-763); see generally Brock,
supra note 171 (noting State Department submissions in seven post-FSIA cases). When Congress enacted
the FSIA, the Legal Adviser's Office informed the Justice Department that the Department of State would
no longer make any immunity determinations. It would, however, "play the same role in sovereign
immunity cases that it does in other types of litigation-e.g., appearing as amicus curiae in cases of
significant interest to the Government." Letter from the Legal Adviser of the Department of State (Monroe
Leigh) to the Attorney General (Nov. 2, 1976), reprinted in 41 Fed. Reg. 50,883, 50,884 (1976).
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do arise, the Act should expressly direct the courts to unearth and to balance
the competing U.S. interests in the denial or grant of immunity. Thus, if the
court has properly identified each cause of action, has determined that it has
personal jurisdiction, has identified no international law bar to the exercise of
jurisdiction, and has concluded that the cause of action arises out of a modality
and not a policy, it would balance the extent of the U.S. interest in exercising
jurisdiction against the U.S. reciprocity interest. These are the same questions
that Congress should ask in crafting enumerated exceptions. To be sure, they
are better answered in a legislative setting. If Congress does not wish to cut
off consideration of novel cases, however, it should not leave the courts with
the same inadequate guidance that has led to their resounding criticism of the
current FSIA.
b. Commercial Tort Cases
A revised FSIA must also expressly address tort cases that arise in connec-
tion with an allegedly commercial activity. These cases result not from consen-
sual transactions such as contracts or loans, but from unilateral foreign state
actions, such as official statements that allegedly damage plaintiffs' business
or an explosion of an allegedly commercial oil well. The FSIA's noncommer-
cial tort exception, like the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),2 7 preserves
immunity for noncommercial torts with respect to "any claim arising out of
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation,
deceit, or interference with contract rights."z22 Tort claims alleging a nexus
to a commercial activity present difficulties because they straddle two excep-
tions to immunity that are usually explained separately. Unlike the commercial
activity exception, the noncommercial tort exception does not concern itself
with possible interference with the foreign state's functions.' If the tort is
of a kind covered by the statute,"0 the forum state's prerogative to exercise
227. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1326(b), 2671-80 (1988).
228. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(B) (1988). By contrast, foreign statutes and the I.L.C. draft articles
generally limit the tort exception to proceedings concerning death, personal injury, and loss of or damage
to tangible property. See Australian Immunity Act, supra note 8, § 13; U.K. Immunity Act, supra note
185, § 5; 1991 LL. C. Report, supra note 2, art. 12, at 102; id. at 103 (commentary). By limiting the excep-
tion to damage to tangible property, the I.L.C. sought to exclude defamation actions and actions involving
interference with contract. Id. at 104 (commentary).
229. The noncommercial tort exception does not draw any distinction between "private" and "sover-
eign" acts. Olsen v. Mexico, 729 F.2d 641, 645 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 917 (1984); see also
LAW REFORM COMM'N REPORT, supra note 185, at 66 (stating that tort exception should extend to torts
originating in "sovereign" or "governmental" acts); butsee Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 558 F. Supp. 358, 362-63
(N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding tort exception does not
apply to "public acts"); DELLAPENNA, supra note 4, at 182-83 (criticizing Frolova).
230. See supra note 228 and accompanying text (comparing kinds of torts covered by FSIA and other
statutes).
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jurisdiction with respect to torts committed in its territory"' is given prima-
cy.
23 2
In particular, a revised statute should clarify whether the commercial
activity exception applies to torts excluded from the noncommercial tort
exception. Reciprocity concerns militate in favor of granting foreign state
immunity from actions alleging defamation, misrepresentation, deceit, or
interference with contract, whether or not in a commercial context.23 The
FTCA preserves U.S. government immunity for these torts regardless of
whether they arise in a commercial context. 4 If the revised FSIA made
clear that foreign states retain immunity from claims based on allegations of
even those tortious injuries that occur within a commercial context, the com-
mercial activity exception and the noncommercial tort exception of the FSIA
would apply to the same kinds of torts, but would continue to differ in the
nexus to the United States that each required. The more generous nexus
provisions applicable to commercial torts"'s are warranted by the differing
justifications for the two exceptions?216
231. The FSIA's noncommercial tort exception applies only to torts "occurring in the United States."
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1988). The "tortious act or omission must occur within the jurisdiction of the
United States." HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 6619. Foreign statutes deny immunity only if the act or
omission occurred in the forum state. See Australian Immunity Act, supra note 8, § 13; U.K. Immunity
Act, supra note 185, § 5. The I.L.C. draft articles require an even closer link to the forum state, limiting
the exception to acts or omissions occurring "in whole or in part in the territory" of the foreign state "if
the author of the act or omission was present in that territory at the time of the act or omission." 1991
LL. C. Report, supra note 2, art. 12, at 102.
232. See 1991 L. C. Report, supra note 2, art. 12, at 102 (commentary); Crawford, supra note 8,
at 111.
233. In Gregorian v. Izvestia, 658 F. Supp. 1224 (C.D. Cal. 1987), affld, 871 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891 (1989), for example, the district court rejected the plaintiffs' argument claim
that the commercial activity exception denied defendant immunity from a "trade libel" claim, holding that
the commercial activity exception could not "be stretched in such a way as to swallow the immunities
enumerated in the sub-paragraph (a)(5)(B) [libel, slander, etc.]." 658 F. Supp. at 1233. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed on sovereignty grounds, 871 F.2d at 1522, but also discussed the relationship of the commercial
activity exception to tort actions excluded by the noncommercial tort exception, and concluded that it was
"far more likely that Congress meant the clauses retaining immunity in section 1605(a)(5)(B) to deny
jurisdiction over any claims alleging the torts listed." Id. at 1522 n.4; see supra notes 142-148 and
accompanying text (discussing Gregorian). In addition to Gregorian, for example, the plaintiffs in Millen
Indus., Inc. v. Coordination Council for N. Am. Affairs, 855 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1988), alleged a claim
of misrepresentation which would also be barred under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1988).
234. Gregorian, 658 F. Supp. at 1233.
235. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2); see also supra note 55 and accompanying text (quoting text of
§ 1605(a)(2) and discussing FSIA's minimum contacts standard).
236. This proposal assumes Congress will retain the existing FSIA noncommercial tort exception
which, in addition to preserving immunity for certain enumerated torts, accords immunity with respect to
claims "based on the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function.'
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) (1988). The present noncommercial tort exception, however, was grafted onto
the FSIA from the FTCA, see HousE REPoRT, supra note 4, at 6620, and is not without its own difficul-
ties. In the context of the FTCA, the Supreme Court recently rejected a distinction between "policy
oriented" immune activities and "operational" activities that would not be immune. United States v.
Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. 1267 (1991). The Court, reviewing an action brought by the major shareholder of a
failed thrift, held that the government was immune from allegations of negligence in the day-to-day opera-
tion of the thrift because the noncommercial tort exception preserves immunity for any exercise of discretion
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5. An Incremental Approach to Reforming Foreign State Immunity Law
The inadequacies of the FSIA's commercial activity exception underscore
the merits of proposals for fresh thinking about the limits of forum state
jurisdiction over cases against foreign states. Unfortunately, the doctrinal
history that provides grist for commentators' mills makes the existing doctrine
familiar, perhaps even fundamental, to governments. There may come a time
for radical reconceptions, perhaps abandoning the presumption of immunity
or even discarding the immunity rubric. In the meantime, however, the
restrictive theory must be reoriented to its functional underpinnings.
The proposals presented here do not vanquish the problem of identifying
immune transactions. Congressional direction that courts identify a cause of
action precisely and decide personal jurisdiction before considering immunity
may reduce the burden the FSIA now places on the immunity determination.
By including a list of enumerated exceptions and a default provision directing
the courts to weigh the interests implicated by the immunity determination, as
well as specific guidance with respect to commercial torts, Congress would
acknowledge that, as Professor Brownlie has aptly stated, foreign state immuni-
ty is "a house with many rooms" 7 in which the formulation that best balanc-
es competing interests varies from activity to activity. It is possible to suggest
certain aspects of an activity that would normally be relevant to the immunity
determination, and to articulate the interests to be weighed in determining
whether the foreign state should be immune. Because it has not been possible
to find a single formulation that crisply states how the immunity determination
should be made with respect to all activities, a set of enumerated categories,
supported by a default standard, provides the best approach.
"grounded in regulatory policy.' Id. at 1275 n.7.
Earlier Supreme Court cases also suggest that the discretionary function exception can be applied
broadly. See, e.g., Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953) (holding U.S. government immune from
tort action arising out of explosion of fertilizer pending shipment to France as part of post-war assistance
to European agriculture); see generally Harold J. Krent, Preserving Discretion Without Sacrificing Deter-
rence: Federal Govermnental Liability in Tort, 38 UCLA L. REV. 871 (1991) (summarizing Supreme Court
opinions applying FTCA discretionary function exception). Moreover, courts applying the FSIA's discre-
tionary function exception have borrowed from FTCA jurisprudence to conclude that the exception does
not extend to illegal acts. See, e.g., Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1431 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 27 (1990) (refusing to grant immunity on grounds that discretionary function exception
is "inapplicable when an employee of a foreign government violates its own internal law'); Letelier v.
Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 673 (D.D.C. 1980) (refusing to grant immunity on grounds that for-
eign country "has no 'discretion' to perpetrate conduct designed to result in action that is clearly contrary
to the precepts of humanity as recognized in both national and international law'). The results of these cases
concerning politically motivated murders have won international acceptance. For example, the I.L.C. draft
articles extend the tort exception to "political assassination." 1991 LL.C. Report, supra note 2, art. 12;
id. at 103 (commentary, citing Letelier). In other cases, however, where an activity is illegal under U.S.
law but not under the foreign state's law, or vice versa, the exclusion may be more difficult to apply.
237. Brownlie, supra note 10, at 23-24.
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V. CONCLUSION
Governments often confront a tension between a desire to demonstrate
compliance with emerging international legal norms and an interest in shaping
those norms by taking and advocating particular positions. Foreign state
immunity cases heighten this tension, because a court and not a foreign
ministry official must make the decision. If the judicial decisionmaker follows
flawed legislation, the consequent decisions will hamper the government's
efforts to advance its vision of the international law of foreign state immunity,
and will give rise to conflicts with international law. The commercial/sovereign
distinction must be excised from the FSIA's commercial activity exception to
enable the United States to walk this fine line between compliance and advoca-
cy. A more coherent U.S. view of restrictive foreign state immunity is essen-
tial for the United States to play a leadership role in the further development
of the international law of foreign state immunity, including the negotiation
of agreements, such as the diplomatic conference on foreign state immunity
called for by the International Law Commission.
A more predictable statute also would benefit both private entities dealing
with foreign states and the foreign states themselves, because both could plan
transactions with more confidence about whether the transaction would be
subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Increased consistency between U.S. judicial
decisions and the positions on foreign state immunity that the Executive Branch
advances on the international level would also facilitate U.S. foreign relations,
because the State Department would need to defend troubling decisions to
foreign states less frequently and would not feel compelled to participate in
litigation against foreign states as often as it has in recent years.
